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Executive Summary
Financial sector aspects have pervaded the euro-area crisis, which can be seen as 
much as a financial sector crisis as a sovereign debt crisis, even though the latter narrative has 
dominated media coverage and political perceptions. The fragility of sovereigns in the euro 
area was to a great extent (though not in Greece) the result of large implicit and explicit state 
guarantees to national banking sectors.
The International Monetary Fund made a significant contribution to addressing the 
euro area’s financial sector challenges. The euro-area crisis exposed the unsustainability 
of the then-existing European Union banking policy framework. National authorities were 
ineffective in supervising banks adequately in the run-up to the crisis, and did not manage 
and resolve financial sector aspects of that crisis in an effective and timely manner. EU institu-
tions, including the European Central Bank (ECB), did not generally have the skills, experi-
ence or mandate that would have enabled them to offset the national authorities’ shortcom-
ings. The IMF was thus in a position to make a major positive difference. 
At the euro-area level, the IMF played a ground-breaking role in understanding the 
dynamics of the crisis and promoting banking union as an essential policy response. The IMF 
was the first public authority, and one of the first movers more generally, to acknowledge the 
role of the bank-sovereign vicious circle as the central driver of contagion in the euro area. 
It was also the first public authority to articulate a clear vision of banking union as a policy 
response, building on its longstanding and pioneering support for banking policy integration 
in the EU. 
In individual countries, the IMF’s approach to the financial sector was appropriate 
and successful in several, but not all, cases. The Stand-By Arrangement (SBA)-supported 
programme in Greece preserved short-term financial stability, but many of its financial sector 
aspects are difficult to assess on a stand-alone basis since it was followed by further IMF 
assistance (which falls outside the scope of this evaluation). With the Extended Fund Facility 
(EFF)-supported programme in Ireland, the IMF contributed significantly to the effective res-
olution of a major banking crisis in that country, and so did the Financial Sector Assessment 
Programme (FSAP) and subsequent IMF technical assistance in Spain. But the opportunity to 
clean up the financial sector was missed in the EFF-supported programme for Portugal. 
The IMF should further integrate financial-sector policy together with fiscal and macroe-
conomic issues at the core of its operations, and should devote particular effort to adapting its 
processes and methodologies to the new context of European banking union.
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1 Introduction
Financial sector issues, especially those relating to banks, played a central and generally 
under-recognised role in the euro-area crisis. Poorly controlled risk-taking by European banks 
throughout the 2000s left the EU banking sector highly vulnerable at the onset of the finan-
cial crisis in mid-2007, and the subsequent shocks of 2007-08 left it in a situation of systemic 
fragility. Unlike in the United States, this fragility was not addressed head-on and was allowed 
to linger. Europe’s banking problem thus long predated the emergence of the sovereign debt 
sustainability challenges starting at the end of 2009 (see, for example, Posen and Véron, 2009; 
Rehn, 2016).
The key mechanism of the euro-area crisis was what has become widely referred to as 
the bank-sovereign vicious circle. The modalities of this mechanism varied in different 
countries but its ‘doom loop’ pattern became increasingly visible as the crisis worsened, 
even though it was initially obscured by the unique features of the Greek situation. The 
bank-sovereign link is deeply embedded in the political economy of each member state. 
It covers the use of banks by governments as instruments of national policy, including the 
preferred financing of favoured sectors and of the state itself (‘financial repression’) and, 
conversely, the protection and promotion of domestic banks by national governments 
(‘banking nationalism’). Europe’s bank-sovereign links were made explicit by a joint com-
mitment given by EU leaders in mid-October 2008 to provide national funding, capital and 
guarantees to their respective banking systems so that no bank would be allowed to fail 
(Council of the European Union, 2008). 
The bank-sovereign link exists in all jurisdictions, but it became uniquely destabilising, 
and thus a vicious circle, in the context of the EU’s single market and single currency. From 
the 1990s onwards, cross-border market integration and a competitive level playing field were 
enforced through increasingly powerful European policy frameworks, including regulatory 
harmonisation and EU competition policy. Banking policy frameworks covering supervi-
sion and crisis management, however, remained almost entirely national until well into the 
crisis, despite reforms such as the so-called Lamfalussy Process of EU-level regulatory and 
supervisory cooperation, introduced in the early 2000s, and the creation of three European 
supervisory authorities in January 2011 following the Larosière Report of February 2009. This 
mismatch created perverse incentives for national authorities to neglect prudential aims for 
the sake of banking nationalism, which prevented banking supervision from being sufficiently 
effective in almost all advanced EU member states (Véron, 2013). In the euro area, the prob-
lem was compounded by the impossibility of devaluing in the event of a sudden stop. 
The set of reforms known as banking union provided a fundamental response to this 
policy challenge, even though it came late and remains incomplete. Initiated at a euro-area 
summit on 28-29 June 2012, the banking union policy package aims explicitly to break the 
bank-sovereign vicious circle through a transfer of most instruments of banking sector policy 
in the euro area from the national to the European level. Its inception was instrumental in 
enabling the ECB to announce its Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme, which 
in turn marked the turning point of the crisis and the start of a broad normalisation of sov-
ereign credit conditions1. As described below, however, banking union remains incomplete 
and will require new policy initiatives if it is to achieve its stated objective of breaking the 
bank-sovereign vicious circle in the euro area.
1  The causal link between banking union and OMT is revealed in Van Rompuy (2014). A more detailed analysis of this 
sequence and of banking union more generally is in Véron (2015). 
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Banking union consists of three pillars, under a standard though somewhat simplified 
classification. These are: (1) a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) that establishes the 
ECB as the central supervisor of euro-area banks; (2) a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) 
that establishes a new framework for bank crisis management and resolution (though less 
centralised than the SSM), with a new agency, the Single Resolution Board (SRB), as the hub 
for corresponding decision making; and (3) a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), 
designed to eventually mutualise the resources and mechanisms through which euro-area 
countries protect guaranteed deposits. 
Even though the three pillars are mutually dependent, banking union is being imple-
mented in a staggered and protracted sequence. The SSM was announced in late June 2012 
and has been in force since 4 November 2014. The SRM was announced in December 2012 
and has been in force since 1 January 2016, but its financial arm, the Single Resolution Fund 
(SRF, managed by the SRB) will only reach its steady state in 2024, and even then might lack 
an effective fiscal backstop2. A proposal for the European Deposit Insurance Scheme, pub-
lished by the European Commission in November 2015, would see the EDIS reach a steady 
state in 2024 at the same time as the SRF but, at the time of writing, no decision has been 
made to implement this scheme. 
Given the essential importance of the bank-sovereign vicious circle and of banking union 
in the euro-area crisis, section 2 of this paper is devoted to the IMF’s role in identifying and 
addressing these topics. It first reviews the IMF’s surveillance of the European financial 
system since the start of the crisis, with a focus on the role that the Fund played in the gradual 
identification of the bank-sovereign vicious circle and its acknowledgement by European 
policymakers in the period 2010-12. It then analyses the sequence of IMF contributions to 
the elaboration of the policies now known as banking union. The rest of the paper focuses 
on individual countries. Section 3 discusses the financial-sector aspects of the assistance 
programmes for Greece (Stand-By Arrangement 2010-12), Ireland (Extended Arrangement 
2010-13) and Portugal (Extended Arrangement 2011-14), as well as the IMF’s involvement in 
Spain (2012-14). Section 4 analyses salient selected themes from the reviewed cases. Section 
5 concludes3.
While each IMF programme was country-specific, their contents were partly determined 
by the shared EU and euro-area policy framework. The IMF acted in coordination with the 
European Commission and the ECB, forming a ‘troika’ with these two institutions (Kin-
caid, 2016). The European Commission was mainly represented in troika discussions by its 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN)4. On financial sector 
aspects, however, the Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP) played 
an influential and autonomous role as the enforcer of the European Union’s unique policy 
framework for state aid control, with oversight of any national publicly-funded interventions 
in the banking sector5. Another significant EU-level policy framework governs central bank 
lending operations to banks. The ECB transacts with financial institutions under its monetary 
2  Euro-area finance ministers have agreed on the principle of establishing a ‘common backstop’ for the SRF during 
the transition period until 2024, but have not decided on its specific nature and modalities. See ‘Statement of Euro-
group and ECOFIN Ministers on the SRM backstop’, 18 December 2013. 
3  The EFF-supported programme for Greece approved in 2012 and the EFF-supported programme for Cyprus ap-
proved in 2013 are not included in the scope of this evaluation. 
4  During the period evaluated, DG ECFIN was responsible within the European Commission for financial-sector con-
ditionality in country assistance programmes. In late 2014 the corresponding teams were transferred to another part of 
the European Commission (DG FISMA) as part of a wider reorganization. 
5  Competition policy frameworks exist in most of the world’s advanced jurisdictions, but state aid control as exer-
cised by DG COMP is unique to the EU. For most practical purposes, DG COMP acts independently from the rest of the 
European Commission, including when it participates in discussions in the troika format alongside the IMF and ECB. 
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policy mandate. In addition, national central banks of the Eurosystem play a lender-of-last-
resort role when providing emergency liquidity assistance (ELA), which is supplied under 
the control of the ECB to ensure compatibility with monetary policy6. These central bank 
interventions powerfully interacted with sovereign financing, through the banks’ purchases of 
sovereign securities and other mechanisms. 
2 Euro-area-level aspects
A. Financial system analysis
Pre-crisis surveillance by the IMF largely missed the build-up of risk in the euro-area 
banking system. Successive Article IV reports on euro-area policies7 aptly characterised the 
shortcomings of cross-border financial integration and corresponding policy challenges (as 
discussed below), but otherwise devoted only partial attention to financial system develop-
ments. They focused on a limited set of indicators, such as banks’ profitability, share prices, 
market indicators of distance-to-default and reported capital ratios, which did not adequately 
capture the accumulation of risks in banks’ balance sheets. This observation echoes the iden-
tification of shortcomings in general evaluations of the IMF’s surveillance in the run-up to the 
financial and economic crisis (IEO, 2011; Pisani-Ferry, Sapir, and Wolff, 2011).
The IMF’s underwhelming performance in this respect was comparable to that of most 
other observers, including most market participants. They similarly failed to identify the 
overextension of banks’ balance sheets that ultimately provided the basis for Europe’s 
banking crisis starting in late July 2007. The IMF correctly analysed just before that date that 
“financial indicators may have peaked [and] there are signs that the credit cycle is gradu-
ally turning,” but it also stated that “the [euro area] financial system is viewed as relatively 
healthy” and that analyses by the European Commission and ECB “had confirmed the robust-
ness of the financial system” – statements that would be shown to be questionable shortly 
afterwards (IMF, 2007: 17-18). 
After the crisis began in July/August 2007, the IMF took a long time to adjust its assess-
ment of the soundness of the euro-area banking system. In 2008, the Euro Area Policies 
Article IV Staff Report observed that “The euro area’s financial system entered the turmoil from 
a position of strength” and that “the area’s financial system remains sound” (IMF, 2008a: 3, 7), 
and correspondingly missed the imminent financial panic and subsequent recession. This 
was in spite of widespread concerns expressed by market participants and other observers 
at the time (for example Borio, 2008; Véron, 2008), and it appears that the IMF took national 
and European authorities’ reassurances too much at face value. At an IMF Executive Board 
meeting in July 2008, staff made sanguine statements in response to questions and comments 
from executive directors:
“With respect to [bank] balance sheets, the situation is generally stronger in the euro area 
than elsewhere, with some exceptions within the area. (…) It is true that European banks 
are more highly leveraged than U.S. banks, but the former hold relatively less risky assets 
than the latter. (…) Overall, the staff is fairly confident that the regulatory and legal and 
accounting frameworks currently in place – Basel II and the International Financial 
6  The ECB’s Governing Council is notified of ELA in advance by the relevant national central bank, and can veto it 
with a two-thirds majority. 
7  There was no FSAP for the European Union as a whole before the start of the crisis. The report for the first EU FSAP 
was published in March 2013. 
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Reporting Standards – can ensure there will be adequate recognition of bank losses in 
the euro area, even if this may be somewhat less timely than in the United States”8. 
By contrast, in the months following the panic of late September and early October 2008, 
the IMF was ground-breaking in highlighting European banks’ unaddressed vulnerabilities. 
The April 2009 Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) was a landmark contribution that 
shed an unflattering light on European banks’ unacknowledged losses, and contrasted them 
with the more timely disclosures in the US and the far lower exposures in Japan (IMF, 2009a: 
Table 1.3)9. This analysis was updated in the three subsequent GFSRs of October 2009, April 
2010 and October 2010. Though it attracted a lot of attention from outside analysts10, and also 
considerable pushback and criticism from European country authorities and the ECB, as well 
as internal debate within the IMF, it was comprehensively vindicated by later developments11. 
The banks’ vulnerabilities in terms of undercapitalisation, funding, asset quality and sover-
eign risk exposures were appropriately identified and characterised. Correspondingly, the 
2009 Article IV Staff Report for the euro area frontloaded its analysis of the financial sector, in 
contrast to the practice in previous years, noting that “the financial sector remains key to the 
shape and the robustness of the economic recovery.” That report aptly emphasised the “need to 
take further decisive action, especially in the financial sector. (…) A resolute and coordinated 
cleanup of the banking system is essential to restore trust” (IMF, 2009d: 4, 9).
As a consequence, the IMF appropriately pressed for aggressive bank stress testing and 
recapitalisation. The IMF publicly criticised the lack of disclosure of results of the first round 
of EU stress tests in the late summer of 200912. Subsequently, the IMF correctly emphasised 
that the stress-testing rounds of mid-2010 and mid-2011 would not be sufficient to restore 
trust in the European banking system unless they were followed up with appropriate action 
(IMF, 2010c: 14; IMF, 2011b: 13-15).
In 2009, staff in the IMF European Department were first to identify the bank–sovereign 
vicious circle in the euro area. Channels of contagion, from sovereigns to banks and to a 
lesser extent from banks to sovereigns, had been described in pre-crisis literature, but less so 
the mutual reinforcement between them in the context of a supranational financial system 
that was integrated by binding policy instruments. Following the Icelandic crisis of late 2008, 
research on bank-sovereign linkages was jointly undertaken by staff at the Fund’s European 
and Research departments. The European Regional Economic Outlook report of May 2009 
included a chapter on the fiscal risks resulting from “the use of public balance sheets to shore 
up the financial system” (IMF, 2009c: Chapter 2)13. At the same time, Mody (2009) exposed “the 
8  ‘Euro Area – Euro Area Policies’, Minutes of IMF Executive Board Meeting 08/69-1, 25 July 2008.
9  Similar calculations were made in the October 2008 GFSR (Table 1.1), but only for US banks. 
10  For example, Financial Times, ‘Shining a light on banks’ deep hole’, 1 October 2009. This editorial, on the recently 
published Global Financial Stability Report, concluded: “These hard choices make the IMF’s uncompromising assessment 
all the more valuable. It helps prevent leaders from waiting for the recovery to take care of the problems: Europe, in particu-
lar, must do more to force banks to crystallise their losses. Telling truth to power takes courage, for which the IMF has not 
always been known. It must keep displaying its new-found boldness.” 
11  The April 2009 GFSR included calculation errors for some central and eastern European countries, which were 
later disclosed: see Stefan Wagstyl and Jan Cienski, ‘Red faces as Fund forced to fix error’, Financial Times, 7 May 2009. 
Separately, some aspects of the methodology used to calculate the unrecognised losses of European banks in the 
April 2009 GFSR were modified in later GFSRs in 2009 and 2010, in order to better take into account transatlantic 
differences in banks’ loss rates. 
12  See IMF, ‘Transcript of a Conference Call on the 2009 Article IV Consultation with the Euro Area’, 30 July 2009. 
In that call, the Director of the European Department referred to the “famous or infamous [European] bank stress 
tests” and commented: “I think that what is now being initiated and done under the auspices of CEBS [the Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors] is a good step, a step in the right direction, and we commend it. But the question is whether 
this is sufficient, whether this addresses the main issue, which is to have a good picture of the financial position of banks, of 
individual financial institutions. And our answer is that it’s not sufficient.” 
13  A version of that analysis was later published as a working paper (Sgherri and Zoli, 2009). 
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possibility that sovereign spreads, the health of the financial sector, and growth prospects sup-
port a mutually reinforcing [bad] equilibrium”14. In the literature analysis conducted for this 
evaluation, the author found no other authors or organisations that identified the bank-sover-
eign vicious circle with similar clarity in 2009, let alone earlier. 
In 2010, the bank–sovereign vicious circle was further characterised by a few analysts, but 
it did not feature widely in either IMF analysis or the public debate. For example, Candelon 
and Palm (2010) noted that while “the consequences of fiscal imbalances for currency/banking 
crises has [sic] been largely investigated (…) [o]n the contrary, only few papers have scrutinised 
the potential mutation of banking crises into sovereign debt ones. (…) Reinhart and Rogoff 
even portrayed this lack of empirical studies regarding banking and debt crises as ‘a forgot-
ten story’”15. Illustrating this point, the April 2010 GFSR included a chart showing contagion 
from sovereigns to financial systems, as had just happened in Greece, but not the other way 
around. In an update of the same analysis in the October 2010 GFSR, dotted lines were added 
from banks to sovereigns, and “linkages to the banking system” were mentioned as among 
several factors contributing to elevated sovereign risks, but the emphasis remained on the 
sovereign-to-bank channel – underplaying an essential part of the dynamic nature of the 
contagion (IMF, 2010a: Figure 1.5; IMF, 2010d: Figure 1.5 and text p. 4). The fact that the IMF 
was slow to build on the early insights from its staff in 2009 about the bank-sovereign vicious 
circle may partly be attributed to its increased focus on adjustment programmes, starting 
in 2010 – including work on the Greek SBA, which diverted resources from euro-area-wide 
analytical work. 
In 2011, the bank-sovereign vicious circle narrative became widely recognised. Par-
ticularly following the developments in Ireland in November 2010, this narrative became 
increasingly prevalent in academic and other independent studies of the euro-area crisis 
throughout 201116. But it took some additional time for the IMF to fully realise the impli-
cations. The widely noted speech by the managing director in Jackson Hole in August 2011 
(Lagarde, 2011), which emphasised the “urgent” need for recapitalisation of European banks, 
illustrated the lingering ambiguities of the IMF’s stance at that date17. On the one hand, the 
MD made the pioneering proposal “to mobilise EFSF [European Financial Stabilisation Facil-
ity] or other European-wide funding to recapitalise banks directly,” which was fully aligned 
with the vicious circle analysis (see Section IIB). On the other hand, she presented this pro-
posal as only “one option” and thus implied that massive recapitalisations might be funded by 
national budgets instead – which would inevitably have exacerbated the vicious circle18. 
The bank-sovereign vicious circle became a major feature of the IMF’s interpretation of the 
euro-area crisis in the autumn of 2011, well ahead of European authorities’ interpretations. 
In July, the Article IV Staff Report on euro-area policies stated that “the approach to banking 
problems remains national, thus perpetuating the intertwining of banks and sovereigns” (IMF, 
14  Several former staff members interviewed for this evaluation referred to an explicit discussion of bank-sovereign 
linkages in IMF management’s communications to European leaders in late 2009, but could not provide documentary 
evidence. 
15  The reference is to Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). Other descriptions of the bank-sovereign vicious circle in 2010 
include Gerlach, Schulz and Wolff (2010), and Alter and Schüler (2010).
16  See, for example, Gelpern (2011) in January; Darvas, Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (2011), in February; Marzinotto, 
Pisani-Ferry and Wolff (2011), in July; and Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl (2011), in August. 
17  The underlying research was published in IMF (2011e); see especially Figure 1.17, p. 21. 
18  The MD’s stance provided support for the launch of the European Banking Authority (EBA)’s recapitalisation 
exercise in October 2011, which had an adverse pro-cyclical impact because it imposed a high capital threshold of 
9 percent with mark-to-market consideration of sovereign debt portfolios. See EBA press release, ‘The EBA details the 
EU measures to restore confidence in the banking sector,’ 28 October 2011, and a critical assessment in Véron (2011). 
See also Lesley Wroughton, ‘Analysis: IMF’s Lagarde shows independence from Europe,’ Reuters, 1 September 2011.
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2011b: ‘Key Issues’). A simple and coherent IMF description of the vicious circle was devel-
oped by the IMF’s Research Department in the late summer of 201119, and from then on the 
bank-sovereign vicious circle was consistently and publicly exposed by IMF senior staff and 
management (see, for example, Chopra, 2011; Lagarde, 2012). The EU did not adopt this ana-
lytical paradigm until the spring or early summer of 201220. 
In sum, the IMF was wrong footed by the financial crisis starting in mid-2007, but from 
early 2009 it was mostly ahead of other public institutions in the identification of the unique 
dynamics of the financial system crisis in the euro area. The Fund’s identification of these 
dynamics played an important role in the genesis of Europe’s banking union.
B. Institutional architecture and banking union
The IMF’s European Department identified and highlighted inadequacies of the European 
Union’s bank policy framework at an early stage, well before the start of the financial crisis21. 
For example, Article IV consultations for the euro area in 2005 led to a characterisation of 
barriers to cross-border financial integration in the EU and of the need for more centralised 
banking supervision (IMF, 2005: Chapters IV to VI). Resulting financial stability concerns were 
expressed in Article IV staff reports for 2005, 2006 and 2007. Several publications that were 
initiated by the European Department in 2007, combined with outreach initiatives, provided 
important analytical contributions to the debate on EU banking policy architecture and went 
into some detail in outlining possible policy responses22. 
Differences of view between IMF departments, however, prevented this pioneer-
ing  analysis from influencing policy to the extent it could have. The suggestion to pool 
supervisory responsibility at the supranational level was fiercely opposed by EU member 
state authorities. This made it impossible for the European Commission and ECB to pub-
licly articulate proposals such as the IMF’s at that time. The European national authorities’ 
concerns were echoed in IMF internal debates, principally by the Monetary and Capital 
Markets (MCM) Department23. As a result, public expression of the European Department 
staff recommendations only used coded, euphemistic terms. The notion of a pan-European 
banking supervisory authority was referred to as “joint responsibility and accountability,” and 
the option of a European resolution and/or deposit guarantee fund was referred to as “a bur-
den-sharing agreement” or “ex ante mechanisms to share costs of [bank] failures” (IMF 2007: 20 
and 27). These watered-down formulations reduced the impact of the IMF’s otherwise novel 
analysis. Even so, the European Department’s work on the EU banking policy framework 
proved controversial when presented to the Executive Board in July 2007. According to the 
minutes of the meeting, several European Directors expressed the views that the tone of staff 
recommendations was “too alarmist;” that there was too much emphasis on “the misalign-
ment of incentives” of national prudential authorities; and that financial supervision, being an 
EU matter, “should not be a focus of discussion on euro area policies”24. In 2008, staff presented 
19  Non-public presentations by the Economic Counsellor on World Economic and Market Developments (31 
August 2011) and to the International Monetary and Financial Committee (24 September 2011). See also Mody and 
Sandri (2011).
20  ‘Euro Area Summit Statement’, Brussels, 29 June 2012. An interview with senior ECB officials confirmed the per-
ception that the IMF preceded the ECB in this analysis. 
21  Only documents from 2005 onwards are reviewed here. Earlier notable contributions include IMF (1998), Chap-
ter V. 
22  Cihak and Decressin (2007); Decressin, Faruqee and Fonteyne (2007). Among other outreach initiatives, the 
IMF co-organised a conference on European financial integration in Brussels with Bruegel and the National Bank of 
Belgium in February 2007. 
23  Based on several interviews with current and former staff, and on the author’s own experience in 2007. Other 
departments, including Strategy, Policy and Review (SPR) and Research, were less directly involved in these debates at 
the time. 
24  ‘Euro Area – Euro Area Policies,’ Minutes of Executive Board Meeting 07/65-4, 25 July 2007. 
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a toned-down version of a ‘European mandate’ for financial sector authorities in the EU, 
implying no change to the institutional architecture (IMF, 2008b: Chapter IV). 
Following the post-Lehman panic, IMF staff made ground-breaking policy proposals to 
address the challenge of bank restructuring and resolution, which were endorsed by IMF 
management in early 2010. The shift of focus from supervision to bank restructuring was justi-
fied by the fact that in the meantime, EU policymakers were making progress with the estab-
lishment of the European Banking Authority (EBA), which was agreed in 2009 and became 
effective in January 201125. In 2009, the staff complemented the IMF’s advocacy in favour of “a 
resolute and coordinated cleanup of the [euro area] banking system” with well-argued proposals 
to create special resolution regimes for banks in all EU member states, building on established 
US practice and the more recent UK Banking Act 2009, and prefiguring the EU Bank Recovery 
and Resolution Directive (BRRD) (IMF, 2009e: Chapter II; Cihak and Nier, 2009)26. In early 
2010, staff from the European (corresponding author), MCM and Legal Departments went 
further by suggesting a blueprint for the supranational pooling of corresponding powers in a 
European Resolution Authority (ERA), with accompanying legal and financial arrangements to 
ensure effectiveness (Fonteyne and others, 2010). The ERA proposal was forcefully endorsed by 
the managing director in a public address in Brussels (Strauss-Kahn, 2010) and referred to in 
the euro-area Article IV Consultations in June27. It can be seen as a prefiguration of the SRM28. 
Until late 2011, these proposals referred to EU-level arrangements, implying that the 
UK and other non-euro-area member states would be included. This stance was consistent 
with the EU legal framework, which did not contain a separate financial regulatory regime 
for the euro area and considered financial regulation as a component of EU Internal Market 
legislation, which applies to all member states29. But it also heightened the political obstacles 
to implementing the proposals, since the UK (together with Sweden and several non-euro 
central and eastern European countries) was even more opposed to a pooling of banking 
policy sovereignty than were most euro-area member states, and was also more advanced 
in tackling systemic fragility in its own domestic banking sector. Developments to overcome 
this logjam were protracted. An important change was the acknowledgement by the UK 
government in mid-2011 that the “remorseless logic” of monetary union would justify further 
institutional build-up in the euro area30. Nevertheless, the Fund’s Article IV Staff Report for the 
euro area in 2011 still advocated the ERA proposal in the context of “the EU financial stability 
framework,” with no mention of specific arrangements for the euro area (IMF, 2011b: 16-17)31. 
The IMF eventually acknowledged the political obstacles to a pan-EU banking union, and 
focused its advocacy of an integrated banking policy framework on the euro area. This shift 
25  The EBA strengthened supervisory coordination between national authorities, but stopped short of a single super-
visor. This would be later established for euro-area countries with the creation of the SSM. 
26  The BRRD was proposed by the European Commission in early June 2012 following lengthy consultations, enacted 
in May 2014, and fully entered into force in January 2016. 
27  ‘Concluding Statement of the IMF Mission on Euro-Area Policies,’ 7 June 2010. 
28  The SRM was initially announced in December 2012, enacted in July 2014, and fully entered into force in January 
2016. It encompasses more euro-area banks than the IMF’s ERA proposal of 2010, which suggested limiting its authori-
ty to large cross-border banks only. But its decision-making framework is less centralised, and the SRF does not cover 
deposit insurance, unlike the European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund that the IMF proposed in 2010 as a 
necessary complement to the ERA. This gap may be closed in the future, if the European Commission’s EDIS proposal 
is adopted. 
29  The SRM Regulation of July 2014 applies only to the euro area and other EU member states that may voluntarily 
join the banking union, in spite of being framed as internal market legislation (based on Article 114 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union). The robustness of this legal construct, however, has not yet been tested in 
court. 
30  Chris Giles and George Parker, ‘Osborne urges eurozone to ‘get a grip’,’ Financial Times, 20 July 2011.
31   Similarly, and as late as mid-October 2011, Chopra (2011) refers to “an EU-wide deposit insurance scheme” and “an 
EU-wide resolution fund.” 
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was consistent with the contemporary recognition of the euro area’s bank-sovereign vicious 
circle (analysed above). An early step was the managing director’s above-mentioned sug-
gestion of direct bank recapitalisation by the EFSF in her Jackson Hole speech of late August 
2011. The next development was the suggestion, in a speech by the managing director in 
Berlin in January 2012, that direct bank recapitalisation, supervisory integration and what had 
earlier been the ERA proposal should be combined into a single policy package for the euro 
area (Lagarde, 2012). This text appears to be the first time that a public authority set out the 
vision of banking union as it was eventually endorsed by European leaders later in 2012: 
“To break the feedback loop between sovereigns and banks, we need more risk sharing 
across borders in the banking system. In the near term, a pan-euro area facility that 
has the capacity to take direct stakes in banks will help break this link. Looking further 
ahead, monetary union needs to be supported by financial integration in the form of 
unified supervision, a single bank resolution authority with a common backstop, and a 
single deposit insurance fund.”
This vision was further developed in the Article IV Consultation later in 2012 (IMF, 2012g: 
Chapter I). The shift of geographical scope from EU to euro area was frustrating from a prin-
cipled and legal perspective, since banking union is essentially a single market initiative and 
should thus encompass the entire EU, but it was pragmatic, given the urgency of the euro area 
situation in the first half of 2012 as well as political realities in the UK and other non-euro-area 
member states32. The IMF subsequently rationalised this shift by stating that “while a banking 
union is desirable at the EU27 level, it is critical for the euro 17”33. 
The decision to initiate banking union was eventually made by euro-area leaders. The cat-
alyst was the increasingly widespread acknowledgment of the bank-sovereign vicious circle 
as the main engine of financial deterioration in the euro area, and the parallel recognition 
– which became increasingly clear in the second half of 2011 – that a fiscal union (enabling 
unlimited joint issuance of ‘eurobonds’) would not be politically feasible. As a consequence, 
the direct recapitalisation of banks by the EFSF or its successor the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) was increasingly seen as the most promising policy option to stem the 
contagion, following its early advocacy by the IMF34 but also by the EBA35 and later by several 
member states. The corresponding debate accelerated in the second quarter of 2012, spurred 
in particular by developments in the Spanish banking system (see below) and the belief that 
Spain’s continued access to sovereign debt markets was critical for the entire euro area. The 
establishment of the SSM was proposed in late June by the German government, initially as a 
check on the risk-sharing inherent in ESM direct bank recapitalisation36. The opportunity was 
32  A legal twist further justified this shift, even though it may not have played a role in the IMF’s own thinking: Article 
127(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which is part of the Economic and Monetary Union 
framework that only covers euro-area member states, provided a reasonably robust legal basis for the establishment 
of the SSM, on the condition that the central supervisory authority would be assumed by the ECB. As it later turned 
out, the fact that the SSM was located in the ECB was crucial to its swift and effective establishment, with the eventual 
transfer of authority on 4 November 2014 being orderly and on schedule. 
33  ‘2012 Article IV Consultation with the Euro Area: Concluding Statement of IMF Mission,’ 21 June 2012. At that date, 
there were 27 member states in the EU and 17 in the euro area. 
34  Following its formulation by the managing director in the Jackson Hole speech of August 2011, this proposal 
was repeated in the September 2011 and April 2012 WEOs (IMF, 2011f: 19, 80; and IMF, 2012c: 22-23), although the 
September 2011 GFSR only mentioned the EFSF’s ability to lend to sovereigns for banking sector recapitalisation pur-
poses, which unlike direct recapitalisation does not mitigate the bank-sovereign vicious circle (IMF, 2011e: 44, 45, 48). 
The April 2012 GFSR supported the direct recapitalisation proposal (IMF, 2012b: 55). 
35  See, for example, ‘EBA Calls for Direct EFSF Bank Lending, More Capital – Press,’ Market News International, 30 
August 2011. 
36  This episode was later related by Peter Spiegel and Alex Barker, ‘Banking union falls short of EU goal,’ Financial 
Times, 19 December 2013. 
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seized and swiftly implemented thanks to the joint leadership of the ECB, the President of the 
European Council and the European Commission, and the SSM subsequently became the 
central pillar of the fledgling banking union37. 
The IMF can claim some of the credit for the initiation of banking union, even though 
the opinions of European policymakers vary as to the Fund’s precise role. Several current or 
former senior officials have argued in interviews that the IMF was not among the main par-
ticipants in the banking union decision-making sequence. Others, however, emphasised that 
the IMF’s longstanding advocacy, reiterated in various presentations to European ministers 
and bilateral meetings in the second quarter of 2012, helped prepare the ground for the deci-
sion. It also appears that the IMF’s credibility with the German government enabled it to help 
overcome initial resistance there. Unlike the ECB and other EU institutions, the IMF did not 
have a direct turf interest in banking union – which made its advocacy more compelling. In an 
interview for this evaluation, a senior EU official noted that the US Treasury was also influen-
tial in advocating banking union from outside the European Union, especially during the Los 
Cabos summit of the G20 on 18-19 June 2012. 
After the breakthrough decision of euro-area leaders on 29 June 2012 to initiate bank-
ing union, the IMF continued to provide significant advocacy and advice. It was used as a 
resource by the ECB in the design and initial establishment of the SSM between 2012 and 
2014. The IMF helped cement a consistent framework, including by promoting the use of the 
term ‘banking union’ to bring together the different policy areas of supervision, resolution 
and deposit insurance38 and, more substantially, by publishing a string of documents that 
holistically described the banking union policy vision (see for example IMF, 2012f; Goyal et al, 
2013; the first EU FSAP, published in March 2013; and Enoch et al, 2013). Through these con-
tributions, the IMF appropriately kept reminding euro-area policymakers that the bank-sov-
ereign vicious circle would not be fully broken, and that banking union would remain 
fundamentally incomplete, as long as deposit insurance remained at the national level and in 
the absence of adequate backstops. This helped pave the way for the European Commission’s 
EDIS proposal in November 2015. 
In sum, banking union is a case of influential and successful IMF policy advocacy, even 
though the IMF was far from alone in proposing banking union, many aspects of which were 
first formulated by academic and other independent experts. The IMF itself was also less 
than fully consistent over time and across departments39. It can certainly not claim exclusive 
ownership of originating (let alone deciding) the set of reforms referred to as banking union, 
which itself still remains incomplete and a work in progress. Nevertheless, its role in the plan-
ning and implementation of Europe’s banking union should be recognised as constructive 
and significant40.
37  See Véron (2015) for a more detailed discussion of this policy sequence. 
38  The use of the term ‘banking union’ in official EU communications was resisted by the German Finance Ministry 
as late as the spring of 2013. 
39  It is striking in this respect that the IMF’s staff discussion note on banking union (Goyal et al, 2013), the prepa-
ration of which was led by the European Department, does not acknowledge any of the IMF’s own ground-breaking 
early contributions on this theme published in 2007 and 2010. 
40  By contrast, the IMF’s advocacy of fiscal union in parallel to banking union in the first half of 2012 did not gain 
comparable traction. See IMF (2012f ), Box 2 (‘The Case for a Banking Union’) and Box 3 (‘The Case for a Fiscal Un-
ion’). 
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3 Individual countries
A. Greece (SBA 2010-12)
The Greek crisis was not triggered by developments in the Greek financial sector. In the 
late 2000s, the Greek banks were considered well capitalised and did not raise major con-
cerns. The Greek banking sector was widely seen as conservative and resilient, with the last 
systemic banking crisis having taken place in 1932. The ratio of private debt to GDP was low 
(97 percent as of end-2008), similar to that in Italy (105 percent) and notably lower than 
in Portugal, Spain and Ireland (all above 170 percent). Several Greek banks had expanded 
internationally, mostly to south-eastern Europe and in one case (National Bank of Greece) to 
Turkey, but oversight of them was considered tight and broadly adequate. Greece’s Article IV 
Staff Report for 2009 mentions that “stress tests (conducted jointly by the Bank of Greece and 
staff) suggest that the banking system has enough buffers to weather the expected downturn” 
(IMF, 2009f: 16).
As the Greek government lost market access for sovereign debt in late 2009, Greek banks 
lost market access for wholesale funding. Liquidity provision was provided by the ECB, from 
a level of around €10 billion by end-2008 to €50 billion by end-2009 and €100 billion by end-
2010 (IMF, 2013c: 19). Deposits were much more stable than wholesale funding, but neverthe-
less declined regularly and significantly from their peak level in the second half of 200941. 
The IMF was involved early on in providing technical assistance to the Greek authorities 
on financial sector issues. An IMF technical assistance mission in February/March 2010, at 
the request of the Bank of Greece, helped on the management of ELA. A few weeks later, IMF 
technical assistance was instrumental in the design of a mechanism by which banks would 
issue bonds guaranteed by the government and thus eligible as ECB collateral, and use them 
for access to Eurosystem liquidity. These “government-guaranteed bank bonds issued for own 
use,” or “own-use GGBBs,” would play a major role in subsequent Eurosystem lending opera-
tions, in Greece and other programme and non-programme countries42. 
The main financial sector-related condition of the Greek SBA-supported programme, 
approved on 9 May 2010, was the creation of the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF). 
Intended as an instrument to provide solvency support to any bank that would be hit by 
unexpected loan losses, the HFSF had €10 billion at its disposal for capital interventions. 
This was innovative and significant, since the Greek situation was not perceived as a finan-
cial sector crisis. The legislation establishing the HFSF was enacted on 13 July 2010, and the 
HFSF became operational in the autumn of that year. The only other financial sector-related 
conditions of the programme were the intensification of supervisory practices by the Bank of 
Greece and a commitment to review insolvency legislation. 
The initial implementation of the financial sector aspects of the programme was compar-
atively uneventful. In the EU stress-testing round for which the results were announced in 
July 2010, all Greek banks were found adequately capitalised except the Agricultural Bank of 
Greece (also known as ATEbank). Majority owned by the government, the Agricultural Bank 
was recapitalised with government funds in the course of 2011. Frequent reviews of banks’ 
funding outlook and continued liquidity provision by the Eurosystem allowed the author-
41  Total deposits declined continuously from €238 billion to €165 billion between end-December 2009 and end-
March 2012, or an average decline of €8.1 billion per quarter (Louri-Dendrinou, 2014). 
42  See ‘Transcript of a Conference Call on Greece’ with Mission Chief to Greece and Deputy Chief, IMF Media 
Relations, 13 July 2011; Sober Look blog, ‘The ECB lending to periphery governments via ‘backdoor SMP’,’ 30 April 2012; 
and Tom Beardsworth, ‘Phantom Bonds Menace Write Down of Greek Lenders’ Senior Notes,’ Bloomberg News, 7 
September 2015. 
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ities to avoid disorderly developments, despite declining deposits and regularly mounting 
non-performing loans. Precautionary capital buffers were imposed on banks, which complied 
through various channels, including by disposing of assets and raising equity. Total credit 
started declining in mid-2010 (IMF, 2012a: 7), contributing to the economic downturn that 
was being driven by many other factors at the same time. 
The financial sector situation deteriorated in the course of 2011. In the first quarters of 
the programme period it appeared natural not to take into account the potential losses of 
Greek banks on their portfolios of Greek government bonds (GGBs), but this stance became 
increasingly hard to justify as discussions about government debt restructuring, referred to 
as private-sector involvement, developed in 2011. In these circumstances, ECB bank lend-
ing operations, which are reserved for ‘sound’ banks, increasingly came into question, with 
the corresponding uncertainty in turn contributing to tighter credit conditions. While ECB 
lending was maintained, the Bank of Greece supplemented it with greater use of emergency 
liquidity assistance under ECB review, at a higher cost for the banks. Attempts were made to 
foster the purchase of Greek banks by foreign acquirers, but were unsuccessful given the gen-
eral uncertainty. Two small banks had to be resolved under a newly adopted resolution law: 
these were Proton Bank (amid allegations of fraud and money-laundering) in October 201143 
and T Bank (formerly known as Aspis Bank) in December 2011. 
The materialisation of private-sector involvement triggered a major restructuring of the 
Greek banking system. At no point in the SBA-supported programme did the IMF impose lim-
itations on the Greek banks’ exposure to the Greek sovereign, nor did the other troika insti-
tutions or the Bank of Greece; an IMF official interviewed for this evaluation noted that such 
limits were “not in the IMF’s software at the time” and were not even considered. In late 2011, 
the nominal (undiscounted) value of Greek banks’ GGB portfolios was about €45 billion, 
compared to an aggregated core capital of €22 billion (IMF, 2011g: 38, Box 3). In addition, an 
asset-quality review of Greek banks that was performed by BlackRock Solutions for the Bank 
of Greece in the second half of 2011 identified further non-performing exposures. Eventually, 
€50 billion was reserved under the EFF-supported programme approved on 15 March 2012 to 
cover bank recapitalisation needs and resolution costs. 
The governance of Greek banks posed challenges that the IMF did not address deci-
sively. The IMF did not initially (during the SBA-supported programme) focus on issues of 
connected lending that may have contributed to the banks’ risk profile, and thus neglected 
lessons from its earlier crisis interventions, for example in Asia in the late 1990s. The HFSF’s 
governance itself was revised on many occasions, but the IMF was not forcefully involved 
in overseeing it44. There were no easy solutions to this challenge, because the uncertainties 
affecting the Greek banking sector during the SBA-supported programme made it difficult 
to mobilise non-conflicted sources of private-sector capital for purposes of bank recapitali-
sation. The IMF’s priority appears to have been to ring-fence the banks as much as possible 
from government interference. In a late-2011 programme review, the IMF argued that “the 
government of Greece has a poor track record of properly managing state-owned banks and 
managing its own finances. This suggests that an effort needs to be made to keep a part of the 
core banking system in private hands, run by competent managers” (IMF, 2011g: 38, Box 3). 
This stance was understandable but it carried the risk of insufficient scrutiny of private-sec-
tor management, as well as of distortions between ownership and control that could pose 
governance challenges, especially as banks became increasingly dependent on public sources 
43  Liz Alderman, ‘Greek Oligarch Is Arrested in Fraud Inquiry,’ The New York Times, 13 December 2012.
44  Based on interviews with IMF staff members and a former European Commission official. 
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not only for liquidity support but also for capital45. 
A separate issue was the impact of the Greek programme on the rest of the EU banking 
system, and the possible implications of this impact for decisions on the design and timing 
of private-sector involvement (PSI). The design of the SBA-supported programme in 2010 
had the consequence that banks outside Greece that held significant portfolios of GGBs, 
prominent among which were several French and German banks, would receive scheduled 
repayments in full as long as PSI was delayed (Wyplosz and Sgherri, 2016). Several banks 
announced their intention to maintain exposures, but there was no binding mechanism to 
enforce a standstill and the incentives of banks and governments were largely misaligned 
in this respect46. The protracted discussion on PSI in 2011-12 implied that eventual losses 
on such portfolios were significantly lower for these banks than they would have been had a 
comparable restructuring taken place at an earlier date. It also implied that to achieve a given 
amount of sovereign debt reduction, a larger haircut would be needed now, compared with 
the earlier period when the total pool of Greek sovereign debt held in the private sector was 
larger. The IMF appears not to have had a clear picture of exposures to Greece in the early 
phase of reflection about a future PSI in the late spring and summer of 2010, and indeed to 
have struggled to collect reliable data on these (IMF, 2010b: 12, 16).
The extent to which concerns about banks outside Greece weighed on decisions on the 
timing and design of private-sector involvement is debatable. Some observers have argued 
that the choice not to have a PSI in May 2010 was largely or even primarily motivated by a 
desire to protect the French and German banks that held Greek GGBs, which would have 
been affected by ‘direct’ contagion (ie losses on the Greek debt that would be restructured) 
(see, for example, Véron, 2010). But there were simultaneous concerns about ‘indirect’ 
contagion to other euro-area sovereign issuers that were perceived as fragile (such as Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain), through a general decrease in confidence in the safety of euro-area 
government debt if this were shown to carry credit risk. Concerns about indirect contagion, 
which were partly informed by the experience of the post-Lehman panic, appear to have been 
the decisive driver of the choices made, at least by the IMF and ECB, and possibly also by the 
French and German governments47. The delay in agreeing on PSI in 2011 can be attributed 
primarily to the flaws in European decision-making processes and to insufficient focus of 
attention and decisiveness (compounded by an unexpected management transition) at the 
IMF, even though it also suited the financial interest of the banks that were receiving reim-
bursements from Greece in the meantime.
The fact that only the SBA-supported programme is evaluated here makes it difficult to 
carry out a holistic assessment of the financial-sector aspects of the Fund’s work in Greece. 
On the positive side, programme conditions related to the financial sector were broadly 
met, and no major disorderly developments occurred in the Greek financial sector in spite 
of the highly challenging environment. On the negative side, the lack of sufficient attention 
paid to issues related to Greek banks’ governance and ownership might have contributed 
to difficulties at a later date; no effort was made to limit Greek banks’ exposure to the Greek 
45  In the same vein, the March 2012 EFF-supported programme for Greece included a mechanism that limited the 
exercise of voting rights by the HFSF in banks “where the private sector materially contributes,” with this contribution 
deemed “material” even when only 10 percent of the total (IMF, 2012a: 26-27).
46  By contrast, the European Bank Coordination Initiative (also known as the Vienna Initiative) – which was 
launched in early 2009 to maintain western European banks’ exposures in central and eastern Europe, with IMF 
participation alongside other national and international institutions – was based on a strong alignment of incentives, 
since many banks had a strategic interest in their central and eastern European operations. 
47  Based on an interview with IMF staff members, the interests of French banks may have been a factor in the French 
government’s initial opposition to the IMF’s involvement in the Greek rescue in early 2010, but no evidence was found 
that they determined the French government’s positions in later episodes. 
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government; and the lack of progress on insolvency reform contributed to the accumulation 
of unaddressed NPLs. It should be noted, however, that any impact of these shortcomings 
was dwarfed by other drivers of the Greek sequence, including the lack of national ownership, 
structural features of the Greek economy and political system, and the reluctance of other EU 
member states to provide unambiguous support to Greece as a member of the euro area48. 
B. Ireland (Extended Arrangement 2010-13)
Ireland was a textbook case of the banks-to-sovereign part of the bank-sovereign vicious 
circle – namely a major banking crisis leading to the sovereign’s loss of market access. It dif-
fered from the Greek case, where the contagion was from sovereign to banks. The Irish banks 
aggressively expanded their balance sheets and risk-taking in the 2000s in an environment 
of connected lending and inadequate national supervision (Regling and Watson, 2010; CBI, 
2010; CIBSI, 2011; IMF, 2015). In response to the post-Lehman turmoil in late September 
2008, the government extended a blanket two-year guarantee on all bank liabilities, which 
was later partly extended into 2011. The government then nationalised Anglo Irish Bank 
in January 2009; recapitalised the two largest domestic banks, Allied Irish Banks (AIB) and 
Bank of Ireland (BoI), in February 2009; established the National Asset Management Agency 
(NAMA) with the aim to purchase impaired loans from the banks, later in 2009; and national-
ised the Irish Nationwide Building Society (INBS), in December 2009. The resulting contin-
gent liabilities, combined with the sharp economic downturn, led to market speculation as 
early as January 2009 that Ireland might need IMF support49, and indeed this scenario was 
discussed by Fund staff with the authorities in early 2009 (Donovan, 2016).
The IMF’s surveillance did not anticipate the Irish crisis. In 2007, the Executive Board 
“welcomed the indicators confirming the soundness of the Irish banking system, including the 
stress tests suggesting that cushions are adequate to cover a range of shocks even in the face of 
large exposures to the property market”50. Donovan (2016) mentions, among various short-
comings, the inadequate attention paid to risks linked to the commercial property market. He 
notes that in 2008 “the Fund essentially absented itself from the Irish stage,” in part because the 
mission chief was reassigned to work full time on the UK; and the 2008 Article IV consultation 
never took place. The authorities appear not to have interacted at all with the IMF when they 
guaranteed bank liabilities in October 200851. The IMF’s engagement with Ireland caught up 
rapidly in 2009, however. 
Irish banks lost wholesale market access in 2010. Considerable losses materialised for the 
banks as the NAMA purchased property loans at a steep discount to book value, even though 
their market value was even lower. Corporate clients also increasingly withdrew deposits. 
ECB liquidity to Irish banks rose rapidly during 2010 and eventually peaked at around €90 
billion in early 2011, supplemented by emergency liquidity assistance from the Central Bank 
of Ireland (CBI) at an additional €60 billion52. Moreover, in spite of very large public capi-
tal injections into banks (€46 billion in aggregate by mid-2010), the banks’ solvency came 
increasingly into question. Successive rounds of stress testing by the CBI in 2009 and 2010, 
dubbed the Prudential Capital Assessment Review (PCAR), failed to establish trust because 
analysts remained less than convinced by methodological choices and stress assumptions. 
48  The Fund’s own Ex Post Evaluation of the Greek SBA (IMF, 2013c) does not refer to the adjustment programme’s 
financial sector aspects other than in a purely descriptive manner. 
49  Transcript of a press briefing by David Hawley, Senior Advisor, External Relations Department, IMF, 15 Janu-
ary 2009, https://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2009/tr011509.htm. 
50  ‘IMF Executive Board Concludes Article IV Consultation with Ireland,’ Public Information Notice No.117, 25 
September 2007.
51  Interview with former IMF staff member, 2015. 
52  The numbers in this paragraph are from IMF (2015: 8). On Eurosystem liquidity see also IMF (2013a:10). 
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The same applied to Ireland’s participation in the EU-wide stress-testing exercises of Septem-
ber 2009 and July 2010. Since Eurosystem liquidity is reserved for ‘sound’ and solvent banks, 
the ECB made it clear to the Irish government in October 2010 that resolute actions would be 
needed to enable its continued provision53. Meanwhile, the aftermath of the French-German 
declaration in Deauville (16 October 2010), which appeared to encourage PSI as a component 
of future assistance programmes, led to further deterioration of financing conditions. The 
Irish authorities requested assistance in early November, and the staff-level agreement on the 
EFF-supported programme was announced by the IMF on 28 November 2010.
The treatment of senior bank bonds, widely referred to in Ireland as “burning the bond-
holders,” was a salient issue for the IMF. Former senior Irish officials who were involved in 
the programme discussions said in interviews conducted for this evaluation that the option 
of imposing losses (or ‘bail-in’) on senior bank bonds was introduced informally by the IMF 
mission staff during pre-programme discussions in November 2010, to the considerable 
frustration of the ECB, and was immediately supported by the Irish authorities. The author-
ities, however, had concerns that the proposal might not have been fully thought through 
from a technical and legal standpoint. From interviews conducted for this evaluation, it 
appears that European Department staff at the time estimated the potential impact of the 
bail-in at as much as €16-17 billion, as they argued it could be applied to the ‘going-concern’ 
Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks (also known in Ireland as ‘pillar banks’), as well as to 
the ‘gone-concern’ Anglo Irish and Irish Nationwide Building Society. By contrast, the Irish 
authorities believed that bailing-in the bonds of the pillar banks might create broad uncer-
tainty and result in high indirect costs for the Irish economy. Nevertheless, imposing losses on 
gone-concern banks’ bonds alone, the outstanding amount of which was €4-5 billion, would 
potentially have yielded €2-3 billion of relief, a not-insignificant amount in the Irish context54. 
The Fund’s MCM Department was more worried about contagion to other euro-area banks. 
The issue of “burning the bondholders” was discussed in a G7 conference call on 26 
November 2010. The IMF’s managing director participated and presented the case for bail-in. 
As was widely covered in the Irish press55, the ECB’s adamant opposition to this action was 
supported by several participants in the call including, crucially, the US Treasury Secre-
tary, on the basis that the financial gain for Ireland would not justify the risk of destabilising 
bank bond markets well beyond Ireland, even assuming that the bail-in would only affect 
gone-concern banks. This temporarily settled the matter. The staff report for the programme 
request, issued two days later, nevertheless included a reference to criteria for future deci-
sions on bank bonds which left open the possibility of re-examining the bail-in possibility at a 
later stage (Chopra, 2015: 8). Meanwhile, the IMF’s pro-bail-in stance, which quickly became 
publicly known, made the Fund comparatively more popular in Ireland. 
The “burning the bondholders” controversy resurfaced in March 2011. The matter was 
intensely debated in the campaign for the national election of 25 February 2011, even though 
at that time it was only about the gone-concern banks, namely Anglo Irish Bank and INBS, 
which were to be wound up. In late March, the new Irish finance minister intended to refer 
to it in his maiden speech to the Irish Parliament, a draft of which he submitted to the troika 
53  The content of letters from the ECB President to the Irish Finance Minister on 15 October and 19 November 2010, 
as well as responses, was published by the ECB in November 2014 and can be accessed at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/
press/html/irish-letters.en.html.
54  This latter amount was mentioned by an Irish interviewee as the estimate made by the Irish Treasury Management 
Agency in February or March 2011. Bonds outstanding could not be fully bailed-in because of several legal constraints, 
including that the banks had been made technically solvent by the government following their nationalisation in 2009, 
and that some of the debt was in the form of covered bonds. 
55  See, for example, Arthur Beesley, ‘Dark days: behind the bailout,’ Irish Times, 19 November 2011. 
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institutions. While the IMF was still in favour of bail-in, the ECB again successfully opposed it. 
As a consequence, only junior (subordinated) debt was bailed-in, for all four banks (AIB, BoI, 
Anglo Irish and INBS), with corresponding losses for creditors of €5 billion in aggregate (see 
below)56. The episode left a sense of unfairness against Ireland that played a big role in later 
enabling a financial restructuring known as the “promissory notes transaction”57. Interviewees 
from the Irish authorities assessed this transaction as having been eventually much more 
beneficial to Ireland than the bail-in of gone-concern bank bonds would have been – even 
though most commentators in public debate and the media, and the Irish public more gener-
ally, do not appear to acknowledge the advantageous nature of this trade-off. 
The IMF’s decisions in the course of the “burning the bondholders” controversy were 
broadly appropriate. It was reasonable for the Fund to discuss the option of bailing-in senior 
bank bonds, given the potential gains for Ireland, and to escalate the discussion once it 
became clear that Irish authorities were supportive and the ECB was not. Given the potential 
implications for global financial stability, it was also appropriate that this matter be dis-
cussed among principals of the IMF’s key stakeholders. The G7 format for such discussion 
was certainly less than optimal from an IMF standpoint because it excluded major emerging 
economies, but no evidence was found that this choice of format came from the IMF58. Once 
G7 principals had rejected senior bank bail-in, the IMF could not include that option in the 
programme, but the Fund was justified in keeping it open for the future and in supporting it 
(restricted to gone-concern banks) during the next round of discussions in March 2011. In 
the end, Ireland benefited from the promissory notes transaction and thus cannot be viewed 
as having been treated unfairly. One key IMF participant later implied in parliamentary 
testimony that the IMF was active behind the scenes and contributed to the formation of 
the promissory notes deal, even though the deal “was primarily in the bailiwick of the ECB” 
(Chopra, 2015: 10).
The EFF-supported programme largely focused on financial sector measures. Out of the 
€85 billion programme adopted in late November 2010, a notional €35 billion was reserved for 
banking sector support, with €10 billion initially earmarked for immediate recapitalisation, 
and an additional buffer of €25 billion for later interventions (IMF, 2010e: 16). The programme 
mandated significant recapitalisation to reach a core tier-one capital ratio of 12 percent by 
February 2011, and a new round of balance-sheet assessment and stress testing, known as the 
PCAR 2011, to restore trust in the underlying capital assessment. 
The PCAR 2011 was a significant and successful milestone. The CBI chose BlackRock 
Solutions to assist it in this exercise, which was conducted at a time of political change (elec-
tions on 25 February; new government on 9 March) and for which results were published 
on 31 March 2011. The asset-quality review (or loan-loss forecasting exercise), performed 
by BlackRock, was the first such independent system-wide assessment in the euro area59. 
As such, it constituted a notable IMF contribution to European crisis-management strat-
egies, prefiguring similar exercises in other programme countries and the euro-area-wide 
asset-quality review under the ECB-led Comprehensive Assessment of 2014, which was itself 
a key milestone in the transition to banking union. The results of the PCAR 2011 formed the 
basis for later supervisory action in Ireland and, unlike the CBI’s PCAR rounds in 2009 and 
2010, did not require significant subsequent revision. The exercise identified a capital need of 
€24 billion, of which about €17 billion was injected by the government, €5 billion came from 
56  The SRM and BRRD have created a more predictable policy framework for senior bank debt bail-in in future such 
situations in the euro area.
57  The promissory notes transaction is described in IMF (2013a: 5, Box 1). 
58  One interviewee suggested that the initiative to discuss Ireland in the G7 format probably came from the ECB. 
59  There were precedents of similar approaches in prior IMF programmes, for example, in Indonesia and Turkey. 
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the bail-in of junior debt and €1.6 billion from private investors (into BoI) (IMF, 2011d: 12)60. 
The banking sector was further restructured. EBS Building Society (formerly the Educa-
tion Building Society) was merged into AIB in July 2011; Anglo Irish and INBS were merged 
in July 2011 to form the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC), which was later gradually 
wound up and liquidated in February 201361; the Irish Life & Permanent group was purchased 
by the government in 2012 and split, with its insurance operations (Irish Life) resold to a 
Canadian insurer in mid-2013 and its banking operations (Permanent Trustee Savings Bank 
or PTSB) restructured in 2012; the credit unions sector was also overhauled, with a new Credit 
Union Bill adopted in September 2012 and a number of local credit unions closed or recapi-
talised. Rather than renewing the whole PCAR approach every year as initially envisaged, the 
CBI performed a so-called “point-in-time balance sheet assessment” as of end-June 2013 in the 
last quarter of that year, in anticipation of the ECB-led Comprehensive Assessment of 201462. 
Controversy arose about the fate of Irish Life & Permanent (later PTSB). The ECB advo-
cated its merger into the Bank of Ireland, an option that would have allowed faster reimburse-
ment of the Eurosystem liquidity on which it kept relying. But DG COMP insisted that keeping 
alive a third significant bank (aside from AIB and BoI) was needed to ensure a sound financial 
sector structure, and that saddling BoI with IL&P/PTSB would hamper its recovery. The IMF 
initially sided with the ECB, apparently assuming that the Irish banking sector would remain 
contestable and that a temporary duopoly would thus not be overly harmful. The protracted 
weakness of the Irish banking sector since then suggests that the Fund may have overesti-
mated the short-to-medium-term potential for foreign-bank entry. Eventually the stance of 
DG COMP prevailed. Overall it appears that there was no first-best option on PTSB, and in 
this context the sequence of decision making appears to have been reasonable. Former par-
ticipants from the IMF, ECB and DG COMP stated in interviews that the discussion remained 
focused on policy substance throughout. 
The banks’ deleveraging weighed negatively on Irish growth, but this was mitigated by 
the large amounts of foreign assets held by the banks, which could be sold without contrib-
uting to domestic deleveraging. It was also helpful that a key engine of the Irish economy 
–operations of large foreign (including many American) multinationals – was not primarily 
dependent on the domestic banking system. Nevertheless, the credit reduction that occurred 
in Ireland was significant. 
The IMF’s technical input was valued by the Irish authorities. The IMF helped the Central 
Bank of Ireland to enforce better implementation of International Financial Reporting Stand-
ards, especially in loan provisioning and disclosure practices, and to enhance supervisory 
quality through the assessment of compliance with the Basel Committee’s core principles for 
effective supervision. A difficult point was the treatment of NPLs and the recovery of mort-
gage arrears, but though the outcome was frustrating – given delays in corresponding actions 
by banks – the IMF’s contribution was considered helpful by several stakeholders63. Interview-
ees also acknowledged that the IMF’s assistance on credit union reform was significant. 
In sum, the EFF-supported programme for Ireland can be considered a clear success in 
terms of financial sector restructuring and reform, which was itself a major component of the 
60  As a result, the government’s equity stake in BoI was reduced to 15 percent, while AIB remained more than 99 per-
cent government-owned. 
61  The liquidation of IBRC was part of the above-mentioned promissory notes transaction. This transaction also 
extinguished the remaining stock of ELA, which was around €40 billion at the time. 
62  The Comprehensive Assessment (ECB, 2014) eventually found AIB and BoI adequately capitalised, but a capital 
shortfall of €0.85 billion at PTSB. 
63  See also the Ex Post Evaluation of the Extended Arrangement for Ireland (IMF, 2015a). 
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programme. While the Irish authorities’ ownership was the major driver of the programme’s 
success, the quality of the IMF staff team and the value of the IMF’s contribution to pro-
gramme policies were widely praised. The IMF’s interaction with its troika partners, while not 
always consensual, was also considered highly professional and constructive by all parties. 
C. Portugal (Extended Arrangement 2011-14)
In Portugal, problems in the financial sector were less central to the need for assistance 
than in Ireland, but more so than in Greece. As in Ireland, private debt was very high, in 
excess of 260 percent of GDP (IMF, 2011a: 4). As in Greece, there were significant fiscal and 
structural challenges unrelated to the financial sector, including hidden public debt in state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and public-private partnerships (PPPs). But there were also signs 
of banking sector fragility and of supervisory weakness. A small bank, Banco Portugues de 
Negocios (BPN), had had to be nationalised in late 2008. Another small bank, Banco Privado 
Portugues (BPP), was liquidated in April 2010, while BPN remained in limbo following 
an unsuccessful privatisation attempt in 2009-10; lapses of supervision were widely cited 
as having played a role in its failure64. Other banks gradually lost market access as doubts 
mounted about sovereign creditworthiness, in yet another illustration of the bank-sovereign 
vicious circle. (Deposits, by contrast, remained stable.) In late April 2011, at the time when the 
Portuguese authorities requested assistance, ECB liquidity provision reached €48 billion, or 
9 percent of Portugal’s total banking sector assets (IMF, 2011a: 7). 
Most of the large banks’ ownership structures created incentives for related-party lending. 
Among the five largest banks, Banco Espirito Santo (BES) and Millennium BCP65 stood out 
among European banks for their ownership links with non-financial businesses and, in the 
case of BCP, with a developing economy (Angola)66. Banco Portugues de Investimento (BPI) 
also had significant Angolan as well as Brazilian and Spanish ownership67. Caixa Geral de 
Depositos (CGD), a state-owned bank, played a major role in financing Portuguese SOEs 
and PPPs. The fifth significant bank, Santander Totta, had been owned since 2000 by Spain’s 
Santander group. 
The programme that was approved by the IMF Executive Board on 20 May 2011 included a 
number of policies focused on the financial sector. These included, among others: measures 
to maintain access to ECB liquidity, including large government guarantees for the issuance 
of own-use GGBBs (as in Greece); a raising of minimum capital requirements, to 9 percent by 
end-2011 and 10 percent by end-2012; a Bank Solvency Support Facility (BSSF) of €12 billion 
(out of the programme’s total €78 billion), similar to and slightly larger than what had been 
included in the Greek SBA with the creation of the HFSF; plans for banking sector deleverag-
ing, including an accelerated sale of BPN and downsizing of CGD; and improvements in the 
resolution framework (IMF, 2011a: 16, Box 1). 
64  See, for example, Raul Vaz and Miguel Coutinho, ‘2010: ou o que mais nos ira acontecer?’ Diario Economico, 12 
December 2010. 
65  The Millennium brand was superimposed on the Banco Comercial Portugues (BCP) name in 2004 but the bank 
remains widely referred to in Portugal as BCP, a convention also used in the rest of this text. 
66  As of 2010, Espirito Santo Financial Group (ESFG), a holding company controlled by the Espirito Santo family, 
held 67 percent equity in the intermediate holding BESPAR, which itself held 42 percent equity in BES. France’s 
Credit Agricole Group held 32 percent of BESPAR and 8.8 percent directly in BES. Other significant BES shareholders 
included Tranquilidade, a Portuguese insurer, and Bradesco, a Brazilian bank, each at around 6 percent. As of mid-
June 2009, Sonangol, the Angolan state-owned oil company, held 10 percent of BCP’s equity; Grupo Teixera Duarte, a 
construction company, held 7 percent; and Joe Berardo, a self-made businessman, held close to 5 percent. 
67  As of end-2010, BPI’s main shareholders were Spanish banking group La Caixa (30 percent); Brazilian banking 
group Itau (19 percent); Grupo Santoro, an entity controlled by the Angolan President’s daughter, Isabel Dos Santos 
(10 percent); and the Allianz insurance group (9 percent). 
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Nevertheless, the Portuguese programme stopped short of a full-fledged approach to the 
financial sector. Crucially, unlike in Ireland and in earlier assistance programmes to emerging 
economies, the programme did not include a system-wide external review of the asset quality 
of Portuguese banks. Instead, the IMF worked with the central bank (Banco de Portugal, 
BdP) to design a balance-sheet assessment and stress-testing programme, called the Special 
on-site Inspections Programme (SIP), which was then renewed on a quarterly basis. The 
option to use an external evaluator with a broad review mandate (such as BlackRock Solu-
tions, used in Ireland’s PCAR 2011) was resolutely and effectively opposed by the BdP, which 
instead suggested the SIP as an alternative approach. The SIP remained firmly controlled by 
the Portuguese authorities. It involved some external review, but by different consultants on 
different banks (including EY, PwC, Oliver Wyman and BCG), only on limited parts of the 
banks’ portfolios and under constraining assumptions set by the BdP. As a consequence, this 
programme stopped well short of an independent comprehensive assessment. According 
to interviews with IMF staff members, within the Fund the European Department deferred 
to MCM on this issue. The option of an independent comprehensive external assessment of 
the banks was abandoned following internal debate in MCM, on the basis that the BdP was a 
trustworthy supervisor and that antagonising it on this issue would diminish the authorities’ 
ownership of the programme. Evidence gathered for this evaluation does not suggest that 
either the European Commission or the ECB questioned this choice made by the IMF, even 
though the issue of external assessment was debated within the troika. Also, the minimum 
capital requirements imposed on Portuguese banks were lower than in the Irish programme. 
The IMF’s lack of an assertive approach to the Portuguese financial sector may have 
resulted from a combination of ideological, political and practical factors. First, the IMF team 
appears to have displayed an inherent bias linked to the perception of the Portuguese crisis 
as ‘mostly fiscal’ and not directly linked to financial sector weakness. This bias portrayed the 
private sector as “the victim not the problem,” as discussed above in the case of Greece. This 
may have created a reluctance to consider options that might result in the partial or complete 
nationalisation of commercial banks, notwithstanding these banks’ apparent incentives for 
related-party lending, their complex governance structures and their high leverage. (Con-
versely, there was much IMF emphasis on privatising government-controlled banks, an 
emphasis that several interviewees from the Portuguese authorities considered to have been 
excessive68.) For example, following advice from the IMF (but not under programme condi-
tionality), Portugal in 2011 passed a legislative amendment that banned the acquisition by the 
government of shares of the private-sector banks. This had to be reversed in late 2012 to allow 
the intervention into Banco Internacional de Funchal (BANIF) (see below).
Second, there was unquestionably a perception that avoiding escalation with the BdP 
would be beneficial for the authorities’ ownership of the programme, which indeed was high 
and facilitated many aspects of its implementation, and also for maintaining consensus with 
EU institutions, since these endorsed some positions held by the Portuguese authorities. 
IMF staff interviewees acknowledged that senior private-sector bankers had very high social 
status in Portugal, and that IMF questioning of the soundness of their institutions would not 
elicit domestic support. Even ostensibly independent Portuguese individuals, whose opinions 
the IMF thought reliable, provided views of these banks’ situation that with hindsight were 
overly optimistic. A willingness to be ‘parsimonious’ in imposing conditionality may also have 
played a role in limiting the Fund programme’s financial-sector intervention.
Third, in a context in which the Portuguese government’s financial position was becoming 
increasingly tense in early 2011, and the risk of missing payments on public salaries and pen-
68  All interviews of Portuguese stakeholders for this evaluation were conducted before the change of government in 
November 2015. 
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sions was becoming less remote, there might have been an overarching concern to conclude 
programme negotiations quickly, and to minimise the upfront funding gap, which could have 
been widened by the revelation of latent losses in the banking system. On a related note, the 
bank-sovereign vicious circle narrative had not yet become universally accepted within the 
IMF. Without sufficient awareness of the bank-sovereign dynamics, there might have been a 
temptation to think that the programme’s objective of sovereign debt sustainability could be 
achieved without fully restoring the soundness of the banking sector. 
The banks’ deleveraging happened at the same time as several foreign banks were reduc-
ing their own exposure to Portugal. This contributed to credit scarcity, especially for new 
projects, because Portuguese banks tended to prioritise the refinancing of loans to SOEs and 
other existing borrowers (IMF, 2011h: 16). The programme’s ambitious deleveraging targets 
were successfully advocated by the ECB, while the IMF was seen by Portuguese officials as 
having more awareness of the negative macrofinancial implications.
The restructuring of the banking sector was limited, however, and several major vulner-
abilities were not addressed decisively. The sale of BPN to Banco Internacional de Credito 
(Banco BIC Portugues), an entity controlled by Angolan interests, was announced quickly in 
July 2011, but the finalisation of the transaction was delayed for eight months by DG COMP 
concerns over the use of public money; BPN’s distressed assets were retained by the govern-
ment and later liquidated (IMF, 2011h: 16)69. Caixa Geral de Depositos significantly reduced 
its international exposure by selling foreign assets. Banco Internacional de Funchal (BANIF), 
a Madeira-based, medium-sized bank, had major weaknesses that were identified from the 
programme’s inception, but its restructuring, involving the government taking a majority 
ownership stake, took place only in early 2013.
A significant share of the programme-related recapitalisation of the other banks70 took the 
form of non-voting contingent convertible (or CoCo) debt instruments (€4.3 billion purchased 
by the BSSF: IMF, 2012i: 9), and thus had no impact on ownership structures. In late 2011 and 
early 2012, there were heated debates between IMF and DG COMP experts on this issue. The 
BdP and IMF defended the decision to leave equity ownership structures unchanged, arguing 
that management continuity would contribute to stability: the IMF publicly communicated 
the concern of “preserving private management of otherwise sound banks by limiting voting 
rights of shares acquired by the Portuguese state” (IMF, 2011h: 15). DG COMP, by contrast, 
unsuccessfully advocated raising more common voting equity instead of less loss-absorbing 
CoCos, even if that would imply government ownership. Furthermore, as the IMF noted, the 
CoCo debt instruments that were used “to avoid nationalisation of the banking system” had a 
high interest rate (8.5 percent) and weighed negatively on the banks’ profitability (IMF, 2012e: 
15).
In the same spirit of maintaining existing structures of control and management of the 
banks, caps on voting rights were maintained (particularly affecting BCP and BPI) – which 
created disincentives against investment by third parties in the banks’ equity capital. The 
programme’s initiatives to address NPLs were insufficient. Doubtful accounting and con-
solidation practices by some banks were left unchanged. While the Angolan operations of 
Portuguese banks were an important contributor to their profits at the time, the correspond-
ing risks resulting from significant exposures in Angola were not comprehensively analysed 
and assessed.
69  The BPN story generated prolonged controversy, not least because of the bank’s links with the Portuguese political 
community. See for example Sergio Anibal and Isabel Arriaga e Cunha, ‘Cinco ex-responsaveis do Banco de Portugal 
defendem Constâncio no caso BPN,’ Publico, 2 April 2014. 
70  Including the implications of the EBA capital exercise of late 2011/early 2012; see footnote 18. 
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The reasons for the IMF’s reluctance to be assertive during the programme’s implementa-
tion were similar to those described above with respect to programme design. The IMF staff’s 
attention focused on the public sector, while the role of the banking system as an enabler of 
public-sector excesses was downplayed. IMF staff was reluctant to escalate financial-sector 
issues with the authorities: according to an interview with an IMF staff member, the lack of 
decisive action on BANIF led staff to consider suspending one programme review in 2012, 
but the IMF eventually backed off. In addition, several IMF interviewees argued that, as the 
end of the programme drew nearer through 2013 and early 2014, the IMF’s leverage gradu-
ally evaporated. On a practical level, the perception lingered among IMF staff – even after 
the euro-area-wide turning point in the summer of 2012, with OMT and the start of ‘positive 
contagion’ – that a more rigorous prudential approach might expose financing gaps beyond 
the programme’s finite resources, that would potentially require a second programme for 
Portugal with assorted burden-sharing challenges. 
As a consequence, at the time of Portugal’s exit from the programme in May 2014, the 
banking sector remained fragile. At €46.5 billion in February 2014, reliance on Eurosystem 
liquidity was about as high as at the outset of the programme, and higher as a proportion of 
the country’s banking system assets (11 percent) (IMF, 2014b: 18). Banking sector profita-
bility had not been restored. The banks’ ownership structures still posed obstacles to raising 
private-sector capital. Significant risky exposures remained unaddressed. In April 2014, the 
last programme review noted that, “The banking system continues to operate in a highly chal-
lenging environment,” citing high NPLs and negative (actually worsening) profitability (IMF, 
2014b: 17). It also suggested that Portugal’s corporate debt restructuring strategy, as elabo-
rated under the programme, needed “rethinking” (IMF, 2014b: 29, Box 5).
Banco Espirito Santo completed an equity capital increase of more than €1 billion in early 
June 2014. Shortly afterwards, however, it announced large unexpected losses and was sub-
sequently resolved by the BdP in early August 2014. A privatisation process of the ‘good bank’ 
that emerged from the resolution, renamed Novo Banco, failed in September 2015. Later in 
2015, the ECB (in its new capacity as supervisor) asked Novo Banco to further strengthen its 
balance sheet and, in a controversial move in December 2015, the BdP enabled Novo Banco 
to meet this requirement by shifting more losses to some but not all of the bank’s senior cred-
itors. 
Many aspects of this complex story remain unclear, and many lawsuits are ongoing. Staff 
from the IMF European Department, and also former officials from the European Commis-
sion and Portuguese government, argued in interviews that they began to have doubts about 
BES’s financial health from as early as 2011, but received repeated assurances from the BdP 
and did thus not pursue the matter further. Media reports on BES accounting practices in 
December 2013 were a clear and public red flag71, and there are indications that knowledge of 
BES’s weakness was widespread in the Portuguese financial community well before that date. 
One Portuguese interviewee asserted that a Portuguese stakeholder in BES had specifically 
contacted the IMF in late 2013 to alert it to the bank’s worsened situation. Separately, the CEO 
of BPI testified in the Portuguese parliament that he had met with unspecified troika officials 
in September 2013 to alert them about BES72. Had the IMF effectively insisted that the BES 
problem be addressed more decisively in late 2013 or early 2014 (let alone earlier), the public 
cost of the resolution would almost certainly have been lower, and at least some of the related 
controversies might have been avoided. 
71  Patricia Kowsmann, ‘Espirito Santo Engages in Financial Gymnastics to Survive Crisis,’ Wall Street Journal, 12 
December 2013. 
72  Cristina Ferreira and Paulo Pena, ‘Ulrich diz que ‘não é possível fazer a separação do Governo da situação’ do 
BES,’ Publico, 17 March 2015. 
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The lingering fragility was not limited to BES/Novo Banco. BANIF was eventually resolved 
in December 2015 at a high public cost of several billion euros. Meanwhile, the ECB’s 
Comprehensive Assessment (ECB, 2014) found BCP to be insufficiently capitalised. After 
becoming supervisor in November 2014, the ECB applied a more cautious treatment than the 
Portuguese authorities had applied earlier to the banks’ exposures in Angola, with BPI being 
significantly affected, among others73. 
In sum, the EFF-supported programme paid insufficient attention to the need to restore 
the soundness of the Portuguese banking sector. Financial stability was maintained, and 
a number of useful reforms were enacted, but the IMF did not sufficiently address crucial 
vulnerabilities and the banking system was not adequately restructured. If staff had insisted 
from the outset on an independent balance-sheet review of all large Portuguese banks, and 
had put more emphasis on banking sector issues in the programme’s execution, the late-stage 
banking failures of BES and BANIF might have been mitigated and perhaps avoided alto-
gether. Perhaps even more important, if more attention had been paid to banking challenges, 
Portugal might have been prevented from suffering from a drag on its growth resulting from 
the prolonged fragility of its banking sector74. 
D. Spain (FSAP 2012 and Financial Sector Reform Monitoring 2012-14)
Like Ireland, Spain was a case of contagion from the banking sector, but it was the wors-
ened euro-area environment that made this a threat to sovereign market access. Ultimately, 
Spain never lost sovereign market access. But the risks from the banking sector were consid-
ered sufficiently large in mid-2012 to justify an EFSF/ESM assistance programme that focused 
on bank recapitalisation and in the monitoring of which the IMF participated. In spite of 
problems in its domestic banking sector, Spain needed external assistance only because of the 
accelerating dislocation of euro-area financial markets, from mid-2011 on. Conversely, the 
rapid improvement of market conditions, following the banking union decision of end-June 
2012 and the ECB’s OMT announcement shortly thereafter, suggests that Spain may not have 
required a programme had its banking problems crystallised at another moment. 
Weaknesses were concentrated in the savings banks sector. Spain’s savings banks (cajas 
de ahorros) had a long history as local public credit institutions under a special legal and 
regulatory regime, with similarities to Germany’s current framework for savings banks. They 
expanded aggressively in the Spanish domestic market, increasing their market share from 
around 20 percent of bank lending in the late 1970s to around 40 percent in the late 2000s, 
and to more than 50 percent of total bank deposits from the mid-1990s. They had no share 
capital, with their equity consisting mainly of reserves generated through retained earnings; 
were considered non-profit institutions; and stayed almost entirely tax-exempt until 1985. 
Control was exercised through idiosyncratic governance structures by groups of stakeholders 
that included territorial entities, depositors, employees and others such as local bodies of the 
Catholic Church. Following Spain’s transition to democracy in the 1970s, their legal frame-
work was repeatedly reformed and a significant number of mergers took place, reducing the 
total number of cajas from 84 in 1976 to 46 in 2004. However, all of these mergers, with the 
exception of a tiny one, took place within single autonomous communities75, reflecting the 
autonomous communities’ regulatory authority over savings banks within their respective 
territories, including over changes of control. Savings banks could sell assets but could not 
73  Andrei Khalip, ‘Portugal BPI seeks African spin-off despite opposition in Angola,’ Reuters, 28 December 2015. 
74  The IMF has not yet published an ex-post evaluation of the Extended Arrangement for Portugal.
75  Autonomous communities, such as Andalusia or Catalonia, are Spain’s first-level administrative and political 
divisions under the Spanish Constitution of 1978. 
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issue equity capital76 or be acquired by third parties other than other savings banks. 
The IMF published an in-depth review of the cajas in the Spanish FSAP of 2006, noting that 
“a fundamental policy question affecting the Spanish cajas is whether the existing governance 
structure is conducive to sound risk management by ensuring that these institutions’ business 
decisions are free of political interference and that proper internal controls are in place” (IMF, 
2006: 3 and passim; IMF: 2009b: 36, Box 1, on lending market share). This warning was later 
vindicated in the crisis, even though some savings banks (including the largest, the Barcelona 
Savings Bank known as La Caixa) remained strong throughout. 
IMF surveillance after the Lehman panic gave appropriate warnings on Spain’s financial 
sector weaknesses. While the 2009 Article IV Staff Report referred to “sound supervision,” a 
staff stress-testing exercise conducted that year identified a possible need for additional cap-
ital, despite the Spanish banks’ high buffers, resulting from the country’s policy of “dynamic 
provisioning,” that had led to additional requirements during the property market upswing 
(IMF, 2009b: 58). Article IV staff reports in 2010 and 2011 put significant emphasis on the 
sector’s vulnerabilities, and (in 2011) expressed doubts that the Spanish authorities’ ongoing 
efforts to consolidate savings banks, though significant, would be sufficient to restore sound-
ness (IMF, 2011c: Chapter IV)77. In late May 2012, liquidity provision from the ECB to Spanish 
banks reached €343 billion (IMF, 2012h: 5). 
The financial system stability assessment (FSSA) that the IMF conducted for Spain in 2012 
under the Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) had a catalytic impact. With pre-
paratory missions starting in October 2011, the FSSA/FSAP took place at the moment when 
the seriousness of Spain’s banking problem was becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. 
It also happened at a time of political transition, with a new centre-right government taking 
office on 21 December 2011. Senior Spanish and European officials who were interviewed for 
this evaluation concurred that thanks to this “serendipitous” timing, FSAP missions had sig-
nificant influence in helping the authorities to acknowledge the reality they were facing and 
prepare appropriate responses. The quality of the FSAP team and work was widely praised by 
Spanish and other European interviewees. 
IMF public communication on the FSAP in April 2012 was controversial, but justified 
under the circumstances. On 25 April 2012, at the government’s request78, the IMF released 
‘Preliminary Conclusions by the Staff of the IMF’ on the FSAP. This text referred to a group of 
banks undergoing restructuring and stated that, “it is critical that these banks, especially the 
largest one, take swift and decisive measures to strengthen their balance sheets and improve 
management and governance practices.” In the context of the moment, it was clear to all 
observers that the bank singled out was Bankia. Bankia was a problematic conglomeration 
of Caja Madrid, Bancaja (based in Valencia), and several smaller savings banks. It had been 
formed in the second half of 2010 as part of the Bank of Spain’s programme of savings bank 
consolidation, and had been publicly listed with the assent of the Bank of Spain in July 2011 in 
what was Spain’s third-largest-ever IPO. 
Events accelerated in the following days and weeks. On 7 May 2012, the Chairman of 
Bankia resigned. On 9 May, the government took control of Bankia by announcing the conver-
sion of its preferred shares. On 25 May, the government announced Bankia’s nationalisation 
and an injection into it of €19 billion of new equity. On 29 May, the Bank of Spain’s governor 
76  Tier-one capital instruments available to savings banks included cuotas participativas, a non-voting variable 
income instrument akin to German stille Einlagen, and participation preferentes, a form of subordinated debt. 
77  The number of savings banks was reduced from 45 pre-crisis to 18 by mid-2011 and 11 by mid-2012. 
78  Based on an interview with IMF staff. 
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announced his resignation, and on 11 June the deputy governor in charge of bank supervi-
sion followed suit. While the IMF was blamed by some parties for having accelerated Bankia’s 
demise and participated in a sequence that had heavy political overtones79, with hindsight its 
public intervention was justified by the unquestionable seriousness of the problems at Bankia 
and the response from the Spanish authorities up to that time. 
The final IMF financial system stability assessment report provided both a tentative 
assessment of financial sector soundness and a comprehensive blueprint for further finan-
cial reform. The report was published on 8 June 2012, and included stress tests results that 
estimated the Spanish banking system’s aggregate capital need at €37 billion, noting that this 
number was lower than most market estimates at the time (IMF, 2012d: 62, Table 11; and 36, 
Box 2 on market estimates)80. Crucially, the report went beyond system-wide aggregates and 
used a ‘triage’ process, classifying individual banks into different groups (strong; viable but 
weak; non-viable), that helped the sounder part of the system to keep market access. The 
report included specific reassurances on the solidity of the three largest banks (Santander, 
BBVA and La Caixa) (IMF, 2012d: 22). It did not mince words on the authorities’ past failings, 
noting that “The BdE [Bank of Spain]’s slow approach in taking corrective action has allowed 
weak banks to continue to operate” (IMF, 2012d: 26). The report and its accompanying techni-
cal notes included detailed recommendations for further reform, especially of savings banks’ 
governance and ownership and of the bank crisis-management and resolution framework.
Shortly after the FSAP report was published, Spain agreed to receive assistance from the 
EFSF/ESM, with non-financial support from the IMF. The Spanish government requested 
financial assistance from the EFSF on 25 June 2012, and a memorandum of understanding 
(MoU) was adopted on July 2081. The conditionality, including on triage and recapitalisa-
tion, the establishment of a national asset management company, and the strengthening 
of the Fondo de Reestructuracion Ordenada Bancaria (FROB, established in mid-2009) as 
a resolution authority, was largely along the lines suggested in the FSAP report and signifi-
cantly reflected the IMF’s advice to the Eurogroup. Also on 20 July, the Spanish authorities 
and the European Commission agreed with the IMF on ‘Terms of Reference for Fund Staff 
Monitoring in the Context of European Financial Assistance for Bank Recapitalisation,’ which 
specified that the IMF was not responsible for the conditionality of MoU implementation but 
that “Fund staff monitoring reports can be used by the authorities and the EC in their reviews 
under the financial assistance,” and added that “monitoring is to be conducted by Fund staff as 
a form of technical assistance under Article V, Section 2 (b) of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement.” 
This compromise –  reflecting the desire of ESM stakeholder countries (not least Germany) to 
have the IMF involved while the Spanish government insisted on its role being only advisory 
–  was seen by interviewees from the IMF and from Spanish authorities as effective in view of 
subsequent programme implementation82. The EFSF/ESM program had an envelope amount 
of €100 billion to reassure markets but, as described below, only about two-fifths of this total 
was actually used. The programme was completed in January 2014. 
79  The previous government was associated with the formation of Bankia and with its IPO of July 2011. The governor 
of the Bank of Spain who resigned in May 2012 had a political background in that government’s leading party. The 
retail subscribers of Bankia’s IPO were left with heavy losses following the bank’s nationalisation in 2012. 
80  The same number was later rounded to “about €40bn” in IMF communication on the programme: see ‘IMF Says 
Spain’s Core Financial System is Resilient, but Important Vulnerabilities Remain,’ IMF Press Release No. 12/212, 8 
June 2012. 
81  The arrangement included a pledge to transfer the assistance from the EFSF to the ESM as soon as the latter be-
came operational, which happened later in 2012. 
82  See Kincaid (2016) and de Las Casas (2016) for more in-depth analysis of the institutional aspects of this                      
arrangement. 
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The IMF produced five monitoring reports between November 2012 and February 2014. 
Under the terms of reference, each included a section on the macroeconomic and macro-fi-
nancial context, and a separate section on monitoring of the financial sector, which according 
to Spanish and European interviewees had much more influence. This divide was the result 
of an internal IMF decision that granted overall leadership to the European Department, 
even though the most significant section, on financial sector monitoring, was led by MCM. 
This division of labour does not appear to have led to significant operational difficulties, even 
though it may have produced inefficiencies in the form of unnecessarily large IMF missions.
The reform programme was implemented largely as initially designed, thanks in part to 
the IMF’s technical assistance role. A comprehensive asset-quality review was carried out by 
the ‘big four’ audit firms (Deloitte, EY, KPMG and PwC) during the summer, followed by a 
bank-by-bank stress test by the Oliver Wyman consultancy, completed in September 201283. 
The stress testing identified an aggregate need for €59 billion (later revised to €56 billion) of 
additional capital in 10 banks. This was met with €39 billion of public capital injections, €13 
billion in junior debt bail-in and €2.5 billion in equity from the private sector, the rest being 
capital gains on asset sales and revaluations. New legislation was adopted to strengthen and 
clarify the resolution authority of the FROB and the supervisory mandate of the Bank of Spain. 
A reform of the savings banks’ ownership and governance was also introduced, as had been 
recommended in the FSAP; Spanish interviewees suggested that the IMF was instrumental in 
designing this reform, but that later the Fund did not give it enough attention to ensure its full 
implementation. A national asset management company, the Sociedad de gestion de Activos 
procedentes de la Reestructuracion Bancaria (SAREB), was established in December 2012 
and in the following three months bought €51 billion of assets from the banks undergoing 
restructuring. As a result, the Spanish banking system was significantly restructured, with the 
FROB acquiring temporary ownership of banks representing almost a fifth of total loans84. 
As also happened in Ireland and Portugal, there was a debate within the troika on the pace 
of bank deleveraging. DG COMP successfully advocated a rapid schedule of banking system 
restructuring, while the IMF was concerned that this would have a negative macroeconomic 
impact. It was possible to shed empirical light on this debate, thanks to the extensive triage 
that had been performed upfront, by studying the differences in deleveraging behaviour 
between the weaker and the stronger banks. ECB analysis found that the two groups delever-
aged along similar patterns, suggesting that the dynamics of deleveraging were largely driven 
by credit demand. 
In sum, the IMF’s involvement in the Spanish banking sector in 2012-14 was highly influ-
ential and successful. In 2012 the IMF was instrumental in a shift by the Spanish authori-
ties, from an initial stance that did not acknowledge the full extent of the country’s banking 
problem, to a comprehensive and effective approach to banking sector clean-up. The IMF 
provided policy strategy and technical advice that was highly valued by an overwhelming 
majority of Spanish and European interviewees. It should also be noted that, just as the 
Spanish programme would most probably not have been needed without the sharp deterio-
ration in the euro-area environment in 2011 and early 2012, the continuous improvement of 
that environment that followed the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions announcement 
contributed substantially to the programme’s success. 
83  Oliver Wyman had been hired earlier in 2012 by the Spanish government, together with Roland Berger, to advise 
on the banking sector’s situation. 
84  All numbers in this paragraph are from IMF (2014a: 9, 10). 
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4 Selected themes
The IMF entered the euro-area crisis with an established playbook, in contrast to its 
European partners in the troika. Especially on financial sector issues, it had experience and 
acceptance of the need for a politically difficult sequence of triage, recapitalisation and 
restructuring, about which many European policymakers stayed long in denial (see, among 
others, Posen and Véron, 2009), including on the value of bringing in a ‘fresh pair of eyes’ 
from externally commissioned asset-valuation experts in the triage phase. The benefits of this 
approach were particularly evident in Ireland and Spain85, even though, as discussed above, 
it was not used in Portugal. On several occasions, the IMF’s heft, and the leadership qualities 
and problem-solving focus of its financial experts, were acknowledged as having helped to 
build consensus within the troika and programme ownership within national authorities. 
Another observed strength of the IMF compared with other troika institutions was its ability 
to interact with, and learn from, financial market participants. From many interviews, it 
appears that the IMF earned the respect of key national policymakers for its competence, 
impartiality and discipline. Several interviewees from the ECB and the European Commis-
sion emphasised their learning from the IMF, on technical matters but also on processes and 
communication. Some suggested that, since 2010, the ECB and European Commission had 
at least partly closed their initial gap with the IMF in terms of skills and experience, but that 
the IMF still retained an advantage, in terms of its greater remoteness from European political 
constraints and its ability to rely on experience gained from other parts of the world. 
The troika format led to tensions, but some of these were ultimately constructive (see 
also Kincaid, 2016). In programme situations, the IMF is accustomed to being in an unques-
tioned position of leadership. IMF staff members undoubtedly felt that having to work with 
the ECB and European Commission in the euro area was constraining and involved many 
frustrating moments. The tensions often resulted from structural differences of perspectives 
and interests. Most evidently, the ECB was concerned that Eurosystem liquidity should be 
repaid quickly, while the IMF put its main focus on fiscal dynamics, including the authori-
ties’ ability to pay back its loans. As one national official who was interviewed noted, the IMF 
typically prioritised fiscal deleveraging, while the ECB favoured banking deleveraging at least 
as much as the fiscal variety. Many IMF staff and other interviewees, however, also noted that 
complementarities within the troika could also lead to better policy assessments and choices 
than if the IMF had been alone or in the unchallenged position of ‘senior partner’. Examples 
of situations when the troika choice appeared (with hindsight) superior to the initial IMF 
position include the rapid pace of bank restructuring in Spain, and arguably also the decision 
to keep PTSB as a separate bank in Ireland (as well as, in the EU but not the euro area, the 
2009 choice not to force Latvia to abandon its peg to the euro). The quality of dialogue among 
the institutions was described in interviews as generally better on Ireland and Spain than on 
Greece and Portugal, especially as regards the relationship between IMF financial experts and 
the DG COMP teams. 
On occasion, the IMF deferred too much to national authorities. The most pronounced 
case analysed here was the decision not to use an external evaluator for the assessment 
and triage of banks in Portugal. This in hindsight was unwise – even while keeping in mind 
that there can be no certainty that a fresh pair of eyes would have identified all undisclosed 
problems, particularly at BES. The lapses in financial sector surveillance in Ireland until 2009 
suggest a similar bias. So did, in some interviewees’ view, the IMF’s reluctance to publicly 
challenge euro-area national supervisors’ practices of geographical ring-fencing of capital 
and liquidity in the banks under their authority, in contrast to the IMF’s involvement in the 
85  And also in the EFF-supported programmes for Greece and Cyprus, not evaluated here. 
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Vienna Initiative. Interviewees with emerging-market experience suggested that the IMF was 
more deferential to national authorities in western Europe than in other parts of the world, 
giving credence to the ‘Europe is different’ narrative in this respect86. The counterargument 
that the IMF was initially reluctant to challenge banking supervisors in the euro area because 
of their reputable past track record is unconvincing in view of recent and ongoing difficulties 
at the time in such countries as Portugal (BPP and BPN), Germany (IKB, WestLB, and Hypo 
Real Estate) and France (Dexia). 
The IMF occasionally appeared unwilling to acknowledge the institutional realities of 
the European Union, to the detriment of its own effectiveness. In the financial sector, this 
was particularly the case with the Fund’s observed reluctance to accept constraints from the 
EU competition policy and state aid framework. This appears to have resulted both from an 
instinctive dismissal of authority at the EU level as opposed to that within member states 
(which, unlike the EU, are formal stakeholders in the IMF’s governance), and from a sporadic 
lack of technical familiarity with the legal and operational framework of EU competition 
policy. Interviews suggested that IMF financial experts sometimes challenged DG COMP’s 
positions without having adequate legal counter-expertise (occasionally because they 
neglected to consult the IMF’s own Legal Department), and that they overestimated the scope 
for flexibility and opportunistic interpretation of the Treaty’s competition-policy mandate. 
In some cases, this stance led to avoidable escalation and/or deadlock. The comparatively 
slow pace of decision making at DG COMP was also described as contributing to tensions. 
At the root of these difficulties, some (though not all) of the IMF staff members involved do 
not appear to have acknowledged the fundamental role of state aid control and competition 
policy as a pillar of the entire European Union construct. This led to a dismissal of the cor-
responding constraints as petty bureaucratic obstacles. More generally, IMF staff were seen 
as less willing to proactively engage with EU authorities than with national authorities. One 
interviewee gave as an illustration of this discrepancy the fact that the first visit to the ESM 
by IMF staff only took place in December 2014, more than four years after that organisation 
began operations (initially as the EFSF). 
Beyond the specific EU context, there were occasional gaps in the IMF’s analytical 
approach to the financial sector. Arguably the most pervasive such gap was the IMF’s ten-
dency to analyse the financial sector through the lens of national aggregates, as opposed to 
taking a bank-level approach. Even without access to confidential supervisory data, the IMF 
has significant resources for bank-specific analysis. This tendency was far from general: the 
IMF made a major contribution in the Spanish case when it emphasised the importance of 
bank triage and aptly underplayed the importance of the ‘big number’ of system-wide capital 
needs. But in other circumstances, the country-level aggregate approach prevented the IMF 
from accurately characterising problems in the banking sector. One interviewee mentioned 
as an example the IMF’s review of the Italian banking system in 2013, and related that to the 
dominant fiscal and macroeconomic (as opposed to financial) culture of area departments, 
the Research Department and the IMF staff in general. Senior European policymakers who 
were interviewed suggested that this bias undermined the IMF’s analysis of the trade-offs of 
bank deleveraging, and that it was more pronounced than in earlier eras. Other shortcom-
ings, partly also linked to the dominance of fiscal and macroeconomic analytical frameworks, 
included an occasional underestimation of issues of measurement, accounting and disclo-
sure, and a chronic downplaying of issues of bank governance, related-party lending and 
management integrity in financial sector analysis. 
86  The IMF’s ‘Europe is different’ mindset until 2009 was characterised in Pisani-Ferry, Sapir and Wolff (2011: 10). 
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Some shortcomings boiled down to human-resource issues. The IMF’s skilled and expe-
rienced experts in financial crisis management who were available to work on euro-area 
situations were greatly valued but very few in number, and their capacity was stretched thin. 
This led to high turnover, including in comparison with other institutions in the troika, which 
occasionally impaired the IMF’s effectiveness and the time consistency of its stance. Some 
interviewees argued that the IMF downsizing of 2008-09 was at least partly to blame for this 
situation. In several cases, the insufficient integration of crisis management and regulatory/
supervisory expertise within MCM weighed negatively on effectiveness.
An exaggerated emphasis on confidentiality may have hampered the sharing of informa-
tion across programmes and the analytical ability to ‘connect the dots’. This may have led to a 
lack of consistency in approach within MCM to the different euro-area country programmes, 
which some interviewees criticised. More broadly, there appears to have been scope for 
improvement in IMF-wide information-sharing, deliberative processes and interdepartmen-
tal coordination. As mentioned above, the IMF performed generally better in this respect 
than EU institutions, but this does not imply that it achieved the best possible practice. Some 
longstanding and former staff members observed a gradual deterioration of the IMF’s internal 
deliberative culture. An additional observation was that, particularly but not exclusively 
regarding Greece, the IMF appeared to put too much emphasis on internal compartmentali-
sation of information out of an excessive fear of external breaches of confidentiality. 
5 Conclusions and recommendations
The euro-area crisis was an unprecedented case of direct IMF intervention in the core 
of the global financial system. The crisis posed significantly different challenges from those 
faced in emerging or developing economies, even though there were also significant similar-
ities. Because of the euro area’s systemic financial importance, its crisis posed an immediate 
risk to the integrity of the global financial system. But because of the European countries’ 
direct and indirect influence on the IMF’s own governance and in the global institutional 
environment more generally, intervening at the ‘core’ allowed the IMF less leeway in rela-
tion to existing legal and institutional arrangements than in most (or possibly any) of its past 
crisis experiences. The unusual experience of being bound by membership of the troika was 
only one aspect of this constraining environment. The IMF appears to have initially under-
estimated the associated complexity, and occasionally struggled with the multiple legal and 
political dimensions at stake.
While the associated constraints might have been a frequent source of frustration for IMF 
staff, they can also be seen as the flipside of the IMF’s enhanced relevance. It may be that 
the IMF’s scope of intervention will increasingly overlap with the ‘core’ of a global financial 
system that itself appears likely to become increasingly multipolar. From this standpoint, 
the distinction between emerging and advanced economies, which remains ingrained in the 
IMF’s organisation, vocabulary and analytical frameworks, should be questioned as poten-
tially counterproductive. Together with the imbalance in the IMF’s governance that gave (and 
still gives) disproportionate representation to Europe, this divide appears to have contrib-
uted to the ‘Europe is different’ attitude which, while not universally pervasive, has reduced 
the IMF’s overall effectiveness in responding to the euro-area crisis. Similar challenges are 
predictable should the IMF in the future have to respond directly to adverse developments in 
other ‘core’ jurisdictions. 
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The IMF has occasionally struggled to adapt to the unique, complex and shifting reality of 
the EU framework. The Fund’s country-based governance has created structural impediments 
to its effective intervention in the EU, given the latter’s hybrid but binding supranational gov-
ernance framework. The discrepancy between the euro area and the EU as a whole created 
additional challenges, as did the fact that EU treaties are more difficult to modify than almost 
any national law or even constitution. One senior British policymaker suggested that the IMF 
had not devoted enough resources to analyse and understand the “biggest monetary policy 
experiment ever” – that is, the euro area’s Economic and Monetary Union. The above-de-
scribed gaps in the IMF’s acknowledgement of EU competition policy and its state aid control 
framework constitute another example of the same challenge. The IMF should further work 
to develop and maintain its institutional knowledge of the EU and its relationship with EU 
institutions, and to join this up with its expertise at the level of individual EU member states.
One emerging challenge in this respect is created by banking union. The supranational 
pooling of banking policy means that the IMF’s traditional tools of financial system analysis at 
the national level are likely to become increasingly inadequate for countries that are members 
of the banking union87. The IMF is and should remain proactive in addressing this challenge. 
For example, since late 2014, mentions of “the authorities” in euro-area countries’ Article IV 
consultations refer to the Single Supervisory Mechanism in matters of banking supervision, 
in accordance with the EU’s SSM Regulation of October 2013, and a working-level agreement 
between the IMF and SSM provides for the SSM to give “the authorities’ response” in such 
matters. Similarly, from 2016 onwards, national FSAP reports on euro-area countries will 
include assessments of the SSM and SRM. It is essential to further develop a strong, perma-
nent and trust-based relationship between the IMF and the SSM and the Single Resolution 
Board, which may be enshrined in explicit written arrangements. Such relationships should 
entail appropriate access to information, but also exchanges of staff and other means of ena-
bling effective interaction in surveillance and in possible future crises. 
The experience of the euro-area crisis also underlines the longstanding challenge for the 
IMF to better integrate its financial system analysis and expertise with its fiscal and macroe-
conomic competencies. The issue of macro-financial join-up is not new and has been at stake 
in the Asian financial crisis, in the 2006 merger of the IMF’s International Capital Markets 
and Monetary and Financial Systems departments to form MCM, and in evaluations of IMF 
performance both before and after the start of the global financial crisis (IEO, 2011, 2014; 
Pisani-Ferry, Sapir and Wolff, 2011: 25). The euro-area crisis illustrates the need for financial 
system analysis to become as central to the IMF’s culture and processes as is fiscal or debt 
sustainability analysis, including in the Strategy, Policy and Review Department and all area 
departments. In parallel, the IMF should also further develop its ability to lead global thinking 
about finance. In other words, the experience of the euro-area crisis suggests that the old pun 
about the IMF acronym meaning ‘It’s Mostly Fiscal’ should gradually be remade as ‘It’s Mostly 
Financial and Fiscal’. It remains to be seen whether the efforts currently underway will be 
sufficient to meet this challenge. 
The preparation of this paper relied on a variety of sources. Among many written sources, 
public IMF documents were reviewed and analysed, as well as some non-public documents 
accessed by the IEO. More than a hundred interviews were conducted with a wide range 
of stakeholders, by phone or in locations that included Berlin, Brussels, Frankfurt, Lisbon, 
London, Madrid, Paris and Washington DC. The author also benefited from numerous bilateral 
and collective conversations with IEO staff members and consultants.
87  While the geographical perimeter of the banking union is initially identical to the euro area, it is likely that in the 
future some other EU member states will join the banking union without adopting the euro as their currency. A frame-
work for such so-called “close cooperation arrangements” is explicitly provided by the SSM and SRM Regulations. 
The supranational 
pooling of banking 
policy means that 
the IMF’s traditional 
tools of financial 
system analysis 
at the national 
level are likely to 
become increasingly 
inadequate for 
countries that are 
members of the 
banking union. 
30 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚13 | 2016
References
Acharya, Viral, Itamar Drechsler and Philipp Schnabl (2011) ‘A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sover-
eign Credit Risk,’ NYU Stern Working Paper, August 
Alter, Adrian and Yves Stephan Schüler (2010) ‘On the Relationship between States and Financial Institu-
tions Before and After Government Interventions,’ unpublished draft, November
Borio, Claudio (2008) ‘The Financial Turmoil of 2007-? A Preliminary Assessment and Some Policy Con-
siderations,’ BIS Working Paper No. 251, Bank for International Settlements
Candelon, Bertrand and Franz Palm (2010) ‘Banking and Debt Crises in Europe: The Dangerous Liai-
sons?’ CESifo Working Paper No. 3001, available at: https://www.cesifo-group.de/pls/guestci/down-
load/CESifo%20Working%20Papers%202010/CESifo%20Working%20Papers%20March%202010/
cesifo1_wp3001.pdf
Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) (2010) ‘The Irish Banking Crisis: Regulatory and Financial Stability Policy 
2003-2008,’ Report to the Minister for Finance by the Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland, 31 May 
Chopra, Ajai (2011) ‘Strengthening the Financial Stability Framework of the EU,’ address to the 2011 
Dublin Economic Workshop – Kenmare Conference, 15 October 
Chopra, Ajai (2015) ‘Witness Statement before the Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis’, 
Houses of the Oireachtas, Dublin, 10 September 
Commission of Investigation into the Banking Sector in Ireland (CIBSI) (2011) Misjudging Risk: Causes 
of the Systemic Banking Crisis in Ireland, Report of the Commission of Investigation into the Banking 
Sector in Ireland, March 
Cihak, Martin and Jörg Decressin (2007) ‘The Case for a European Banking Charter,’ IMF Working Paper 
WP/07/173, International Monetary Fund
Cihak, Martin and Erlend Nier (2009) ‘The Need for Special Resolution Regimes for Financial Institu-
tions—The Case of the European Union,’ IMF Working Paper WP/09/200, International Monetary 
Fund
Council of the European Union (2008) ‘Brussels European Council 15 and 16 October 2008: Presidency 
Conclusions,’ 16 October
Darvas, Zsolt, Jean Pisani-Ferry and André Sapir (2011) ‘A Comprehensive Approach to the Euro-Area 
Debt Crisis,’ Policy Brief 2011/02, Bruegel
Decressin, Jörg, Hamid Faruqee and Wim Fonteyne (2007) Integrating Europe’s Financial Markets, Inter-
national Monetary Fund
de Las Casas, Miguel (2016) ‘The IMF’s Executive Board and the Euro Area Crisis—Accountability, Legiti-
macy, and Governance,’ IEO Background Paper No. BP/16-02/02, International Monetary Fund
Donovan, Donal (2016) ‘The IMF’s Role in Ireland,’ IEO Background Paper BP/16-02/04, International 
Monetary Fund
European Central Bank (ECB) (2014) Aggregate Report on the Comprehensive Assessment, 26 October
Enoch, Charles, Luc Everaert, Thierry Tressel and Jianping Zhou (eds) (2013) From Fragmentation to 
Financial Integration in Europe, International Monetary Fund
Fonteyne, Wim, Wouter Bossu, Luis Cortavarria-Checkley, Alessandro Giustiniani, Alessandro Gullo, 
Daniel Hardy and Sean Kerr (2010) ‘Crisis Management and Resolution for a European Banking 
System,’ IMF Working Paper WP/10/70, International Monetary Fund
Gelpern, Anna (2011) ‘Banks, Governments, and Debt Crises,’ in Foreign Policy Association (ed) Great 
Decisions, pp. 49-60, Foreign Policy Association, New York
Gerlach, Stefan, Alexander Schulz and Guntram Wolff (2010) ‘Banking and Sovereign Risk in the Euro 
Area,’ Discussion Paper No. 7833, Center for Economic Policy Research
Goyal, Rishi, Petya Koeva Brooks, Mahmood Pradhan, Thierry Tressel, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Ross 
Leckow, Ceyla Pazarbasioglu and an IMF Staff Team (2013) ‘A Banking Union for the Euro Area,’ Staff 
Discussion Note SDN/13/01, International Monetary Fund
Independent Evaluation Office of the International Monetary Fund (IEO) (2011) IMF Performance in the 
Run-Up to the Financial and Economic Crisis, International Monetary Fund
Independent Evaluation Office of the International Monetary Fund (IEO) (2014) IMF Response to the 
Financial and Economic Crisis, International Monetary Fund
International Monetary Fund (1998) ‘International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and Key 
Policy Issues,’ IMF World Economic and Financial Surveys, September
International Monetary Fund (2005) ‘Euro Area Policies: Selected Issues,’ IMF Country Report No. 05/266, 
August
31 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚13 | 2016
International Monetary Fund (2006) ‘Spain: Financial Sector Assessment Program—Technical Note—
Regulation, Supervision, and Governance of the Spanish Cajas,’ IMF Country Report No. 06/215, June
International Monetary Fund (2007) ‘Euro Area Policies: 2007 Article IV Consultation – Staff Report,’ IMF 
Country Report No. 07/260, July
International Monetary Fund (2008a) ‘Euro Area Policies: 2008 Article IV Consultation – Staff Report,’ IMF 
Country Report No. 08/262, August
International Monetary Fund (2008b) ‘Euro Area Policies: Selected Issues,’ IMF Country Report No. 
08/263, August
International Monetary Fund (2009a) ‘Global Financial Stability Report: Responding to the Financial 
Crisis and Measuring Systemic Risk’, IMF World Economic and Financial Surveys, April
International Monetary Fund (2009b) ‘Spain: Selected Issues,’ IMF Country Report No. 09/129, April 
International Monetary Fund (2009c) ‘Regional Economic Outlook—Europe: Addressing the Crisis’, IMF 
World Economic and Financial Surveys, May
International Monetary Fund (2009d) ‘Euro Area Policies: 2009 Article IV Consultation – Staff Report,’ 
IMF Country Report No. 09/223, July
International Monetary Fund (2009e) ‘Euro Area Policies: Selected Issues,’ IMF Country Report No. 
09/224, July
International Monetary Fund (2009f) ‘Greece: 2009 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report,’ IMF Country 
Report No. 09/244, August
International Monetary Fund (2010a) ‘Global Financial Stability Report: Meeting New Challenges to 
Stability and Building a Safer System’, IMF World Economic and Financial Surveys, April
International Monetary Fund (2010b) ‘Greece: Stand-By Arrangement—Review under the Emergency 
Financing Mechanism,’ IMF Country Report No. 10/217, July 
International Monetary Fund (2010c) ‘Euro Area Policies: 2010 Article IV Consultation – Staff Report,’ IMF 
Country Report No. 10/221, July
International Monetary Fund (2010d) ‘Global Financial Stability Report: Sovereigns, Funding, and Sys-
temic Liquidity’, IMF World Economic and Financial Surveys, October
International Monetary Fund (2010e) ‘Ireland: Request for an Extended Arrangement—Staff Report,’ IMF 
Country Report No. 10/366, December
International Monetary Fund (2011a) ‘Portugal: Request for a Three-Year Arrangement under the 
Extended Fund Facility,’ IMF Country Report No. 11/127, June
International Monetary Fund (2011b) ‘Euro Area Policies: 2011 Article IV Consultation – Staff Report,’ 
IMF Country Report No. 11/184, July
International Monetary Fund (2011c) ‘Spain: Selected Issues,’ IMF Country Report No. 11/216, July
International Monetary Fund (2011d) ‘Ireland: Third Review under the Extended Arrangement—Staff 
Report,’ IMF Country Report No. 11/276, September
International Monetary Fund (2011e) ‘Global Financial Stability Report: Grappling with Crisis Legacies’, 
IMF World Economic and Financial Surveys, September 
International Monetary Fund (2011f) ‘World Economic Outlook: Slowing Growth, Rising Risks’, IMF 
World Economic and Financial Surveys, September
International Monetary Fund (2011g) ‘Greece: Fifth Review under the Stand-By Arrangement,’ IMF Coun-
try Report No. 11/351, December
International Monetary Fund (2011h) ‘Portugal: Second Review under the Extended Arrangement,’ IMF 
Country Report No. 11/363, December
International Monetary Fund (2012a) ‘Greece: Request for Extended Arrangement under the Extended 
Fund Facility—Staff Report,’ IMF Country Report No. 12/57, March  
International Monetary Fund (2012b) ‘Global Financial Stability Report: The Quest for Lasting Stability’, 
IMF World Economic and Financial Surveys, April 
International Monetary Fund (2012c) ‘World Economic Outlook: Growth Resuming, Dangers Remain’, 
IMF World Economic and Financial Surveys, April  
International Monetary Fund (2012d) ‘Spain: Financial Stability Assessment,’ IMF Country Report No. 
12/137, June
International Monetary Fund (2012e) ‘Portugal: Fourth Review under the Extended Arrangement and 
Request for a Waiver of Applicability of End-June Performance Criteria–Staff Report,’ IMF Country 
Report No. 12/179, July
International Monetary Fund (2012f) ‘Euro Area Policies: 2012 Article IV Consultation – Staff Report,’ IMF 
Country Report No. 12/181, July
International Monetary Fund (2012g) ‘Euro Area Policies: Article IV Consultation – Selected Issues Paper,’ 
© Bruegel 2016. All rights 
reserved. Short sections, not to 
exceed two paragraphs, may be 
quoted in the original language 
without explicit permission 
provided that the source is ac-
knowledged. Opinions expressed 
in this publication are those of 
the author(s) alone.
Bruegel, Rue de la Charité 33, 
B-1210 Brussels 
(+32) 2 227 4210  
info@bruegel.org  
www.bruegel.org
IMF Country Report No. 12/182, July
International Monetary Fund (2012h) ‘Spain: 2012 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report,’ IMF Country 
Report No. 12/202, July 
International Monetary Fund (2012i) ‘Portugal: Fifth Review under the Extended Arrangement and 
Request for Waivers of Applicability and Nonobservance of End-September Performance Criteria–
Staff Report,’ IMF Country Report No. 12/292, October
International Monetary Fund (2013a) ‘Ireland: Ninth Review under the Extended Arrangement—Staff 
Report,’ IMF Country Report No. 13/93, April
International Monetary Fund (2013c) ‘Greece: Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access under the 2010 
Stand-By Arrangement,’ IMF Country Report No. 13/156, June
International Monetary Fund (2014a) ‘Spain: Financial Sector Reform—Final Progress Report,’ IMF Coun-
try Report No. 14/59, February
International Monetary Fund (2014b) ‘Portugal: Eleventh Review under the Extended Arrangement,’ IMF 
Country Report No. 14/102, April
International Monetary Fund (2015) ‘Ireland: Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access under the 2010 
Stand-By Arrangement,’ IMF Country Report No. 15/20, January
Kincaid, G. Russell (2016) ‘The IMF’s Role in the Euro Area Crisis: What Are the Lessons from the IMF’s 
Participation in the Troika?’ IEO Background Paper No. BP/16-02/06, International Monetary Fund
Lagarde, Christine (2011) ‘Global Risks are Rising, But There Is a Path to Recovery,’ remarks at the Jackson 
Hole Conference, 27 August 
Lagarde, Christine (2012) ‘Global Challenges in 2012,’ speech in Berlin, 23 January
Louri-Dendrinou, Eleni (2014) ‘Greece: Taking Stock,’ presentation at the London School of Economics 
and Political Science, October, available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellen-
icObservatory/CMS%20pdf/Events/2014-2015-Research-Seminars/Eleni-Seminar-Powerpoint.pdf
Marzinotto, Benedicta, Jean Pisani-Ferry and Guntram Wolff (2011) ‘An Action Plan for Europe’s Leaders,’ 
Policy Contribution 2011/09, Bruegel
Mody, Ashoka (2009) ‘From Bear Stearns to Anglo Irish: How Eurozone Sovereign Spreads Related to 
Financial Sector Vulnerability,’ IMF Working Paper WP/09/108, International Monetary Fund
Mody, Ashoka and Damiano Sandri (2011) ‘The Eurozone Crisis: How Banks and Sovereigns Came to be 
Joined at the Hip,’ IMF Working Paper WP/11/269, International Monetary Fund
Pisani-Ferry, Jean, André Sapir and Guntram Wolff (2011) ‘TSR External Study—An Evaluation of IMF 
Surveillance of the Euro Area,’ background study for the Triennial Surveillance Review, International 
Monetary Fund
Posen, Adam and Nicolas Véron (2009) ‘A Solution for Europe’s Banking Problem,’ Peterson Institute for 
International Economics Policy Brief PB09-13, Peterson Institute
Regling, Klaus and Max Watson (2010) A Preliminary Report on the Sources of Ireland’s Banking Crisis, 
Government Publications of the Republic of Ireland 
Rehn, Olli (2016) ‘Lessons Learned from the Eurozone Crisis,’ remarks at the Peterson Institute for Inter-
national Economics, 15 April, available at  http://www.tem.fi/ajankohtaista/puheita/ministeri_rehn_
lessons_learned_from_the_eurozone_crisis.120319.news
Reinhart, Carmen and Kenneth Rogoff (2008) ‘The Forgotten History of Domestic Debt,’ NBER Working 
Paper 13946, National Bureau of Economic Research
Sgherri, Silvia and Edda Zoli (2010) ‘Euro Area Sovereign Risk During the Crisis,’ IMF Working Paper 
WP/09/222, International Monetary Fund
Strauss-Kahn, Dominique (2010) ‘Crisis Management Arrangements for a European Banking System: 
Building a Crisis Management Framework for the Single Market,’ keynote speech at the European 
Commission Conference, Brussels, 19 March
Van Rompuy, Herman (2014) Speech at the European Central Bank in Frankfurt on the occasion of the 
inauguration of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, European Council, 20 November
Véron, Nicolas (2008) ‘Europe and the US: A Tale of Two Financial Crises,’ Bruegel Blog, 7 April
Véron, Nicolas (2010) ‘EU Inaction on Banks Grows Ever Costlier,’ Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, 18 May
Véron, Nicolas (2011) ‘Europe Must Change Course on Banks,’ Vox-EU, 22 December
Véron, Nicolas (2013) ‘Banking Nationalism and the European Crisis,’ speech to the European Venture 
Capital Association, Istanbul, 27 June
Véron, Nicolas (2015) Europe’s Radical Banking Union, Essay and Lecture Series, Bruegel
Wyplosz, Charles and Silvia Sgherri (2016) ‘The IMF’s Role in Greece in the Context of the 2010 Stand-By 
Arrangement,’ IEO Background Paper No. BP/16-02/11, International Monetary Fund
